



BLACKLISTING FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS: 
CLASSIFIED INFORMATION, NATIONAL  
SECURITY, AND DUE PROCESS 
JUSTIN S. DANIEL† 
Designations of Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO) by the Secretary of State 
under § 1189 of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 provide a 
key means of thwarting global terror networks by isolating and stigmatizing such groups, 
and by depriving them of financial and human support. This Comment examines the 
role of classified information in the FTO designation process and analyzes whether the 
Secretary’s reliance on classified information—to which designated FTOs do not have 
access—comports with the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, particularly 
when the classified record is essential to the Secretary’s determination. 
To answer that question, this Comment first traces a series of cases in the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, the tribunal charged with 
hearing challenges to FTO designations, and argues that—notwithstanding 
statements by the court evincing a reluctance to resolve the issue—D.C. Circuit 
precedent has likely foreclosed access to the classified record by designated groups, even 
when the information withheld is essential to the Secretary’s designation decision. 
This Comment then presents a constitutional due process analysis and argues 
that—because § 1189 targets foreign (as opposed to domestic) organizations, which 
must establish substantial connections with the U.S. to receive due process 
protection—courts should be reluctant to grant FTOs constitutional protection for interests 
divorced from the contacts used to establish U.S. presence. Finally, this Comment ventures 
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a comparative analysis by looking to a Cold War–era scheme similar to § 1189 and to the 
contemporary cases dealing with habeas corpus in the terrorist detainment context. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Statutory schemes for designating groups as terrorist organizations can be as 
powerful as any weapon in America’s fight against terrorism, because such 
designations can effectively cripple targeted organizations by severing sources 
of financial and human support. In addition to triggering a variety of legal 
penalties, terrorist designations—imposed by high-level officials in the 
Executive Branch—isolate and stigmatize terrorist groups, both from mainstream 
society and on the world stage. These statutory schemes are “at the interstices of 
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administrative law, foreign relations, national security, and counterterrorist law,”1 
and they pose interesting—and perhaps intractable—questions about due process, 
executive authority, and the role of the federal judiciary. 
This Comment explores one of those questions: the reliance on classified 
information by the Secretary of State in designating Foreign Terrorist 
Organizations (FTO) under 8 U.S.C. § 1189, part of the Antiterrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). The Comment first examines 
the role of classified information in the FTO designation process, and then 
analyzes whether the Secretary’s reliance on classified information—to which 
designated FTOs do not have access—comports with the Due Process Clause 
of the Fifth Amendment, especially when the Secretary’s determination is 
based largely or entirely on the classified record. The United States Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, which is responsible for hearing 
challenges brought by FTOs to their designations, has wrestled with the 
latter question in a series of cases—but never squarely resolved it. 
Part I provides an overview of the process by which the Secretary of State 
designates FTOs, including the role of classified information and some of the 
criticisms leveled at the process. Part II surveys a series of cases in the D.C. 
Circuit grappling with the nuances of the FTO designation scheme and 
considering the implications of the Secretary’s reliance on classified 
information in making designations. Part III analyzes the scenario in which an 
FTO designation relies upon support found only in classified material, such 
that the designation cannot stand without the classified information. As a first 
step, Section III.A closely scrutinizes the language of the D.C. Circuit’s 
opinions addressing reliance on classified information. Against this backdrop, 
Section III.B performs a Fifth Amendment due process analysis of the scheme. 
Finally, Section III.C provides a comparative analysis by looking to a Cold 
War–era designation system similar to § 1189 and to the contemporary line of 
cases dealing with habeas corpus in the terrorist detainment context. 
Employing these three lines of inquiry, this Comment argues that reliance 
on classified information by the Secretary of State in making FTO 
designations comports with the Fifth Amendment—even when the 
designation cannot be sustained without the classified information and the 
FTO has no access to that information. 
I. SECTION 1189 DESIGNATION SCHEME 
Following the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center and the 1995 bombing 
of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, AEDPA was passed by 
 
1 Laura K. Donohue, Constitutional and Legal Challenges to the Anti-Terrorist Finance Regime, 43 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 643, 644 (2008). 
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Congress and signed into law by President Clinton. The law reflected serious 
concern by Congress about the threat posed by international terrorism,2 
and took aim specifically at disrupting terrorism fundraising networks.3 
In what is now 8 U.S.C. § 1189, AEDPA provides that the Secretary of State 
may designate an organization as an FTO if she finds: (1) it is foreign; (2) it is 
engaged in “terrorist activity”4 or “terrorism,”5 or has the “capability and intent” to 
do so; and (3) “the terrorist activity or terrorism of the organization threatens the 
security of United States nationals or the national security of the United States.” 
A. Generally 
Designation as an FTO under § 1189 imposes a number of serious penalties 
on an organization. It is a federal crime to provide “material support” to an 
FTO.6 Financial institutions that either possess or control any funds 
belonging to an FTO must retain control of those funds and report them to 
the Secretary of the Treasury.7 Financial institutions that fail to comply with 
this requirement may be subject to a minimum $50,000 civil penalty.8 
Membership in an FTO, the solicitation of others for membership in an FTO, 
and the solicitation of contributions to an FTO all fall within the statutory 
definition of “[e]ngage[ment] in terrorist activity” and therefore constitute 
grounds for barring an alien from entry into the United States.9 The propriety of 
 
2 See AEDPA, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 301(a)(1), 110 Stat. 1214, 1247 (1996) (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of U.S.C.) (“[I]nternational terrorism is a serious and deadly problem that threatens the 
vital interests of the United States . . . .”); id. at (a)(4) (“[I]nternational terrorism affects the interstate and 
foreign commerce of the United States by harming international trade and market stability, and limiting 
international travel by United States citizens as well as foreign visitors to the United States . . . .”). 
3 See id. at (b) (“The purpose of this subtitle is to . . . prevent persons within the United States, 
or subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, from providing material support or resources to 
foreign organizations that engage in terrorist activities.”); see also id. at (a)(6) (“[S]ome foreign terrorist 
organizations, acting through affiliated groups or individuals, raise significant funds within the United 
States, or use the United States as a conduit for the receipt of funds raised in other nations . . . .”). 
4 Defined by 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B) (2012), “terrorist activity” includes hijacking or 
sabotaging any conveyance, threatening or detaining someone in order to coerce another, 
assassinating someone, or using (or threatening to use) chemical, biological, nuclear, explosive, 
or any other weapon “to endanger, directly or indirectly, the safety of one or more individuals 
or to cause substantial damage to property.” Planning, commissioning, or inciting such activities 
are also included, as are gathering information and soliciting funds for such activities. Id. 
5 As defined by 22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d)(2) (2012), “premeditated, politically motivated violence 
perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents.” 
6 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) (2012). 
7 § 2339B(a)(2); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(2)(C) (2012) (“[T]he Secretary of the Treasury may 
require United States financial institutions possessing or controlling any assets of any foreign 
organization included in the notification to block all financial transactions involving those assets until 
further directive from either the Secretary of the Treasury, Act of Congress, or order of court.”). 
8 § 2339B(b). 
9 See §§ 1182(a)(3)(B)(i), (iv), (vi), cited with approval in § 2339B(a)(1). 
2017] Blacklisting Foreign Terrorist Organizations 217 
these severe measures is premised on Congress’s belief that “foreign organizations 
that engage in terrorist activity are so tainted by their criminal conduct that any 
contribution to such an organization facilitates that conduct.”10 
The express terms of § 1189 do not provide a designated organization with 
a hearing, either pre- or post-designation. They also do not require that the 
Secretary notify a designated organization prior to her publication of the 
FTO designation in the Federal Register, though she is required to notify 
congressional leaders in the House of Representatives and the Senate.11 
Once a group is designated as an FTO, there are three ways that the designation 
can be revoked: Congress may expressly remove an organization’s designation;12 
the Secretary of State may revoke the designation;13 or the D.C. Circuit may 
review the Secretary’s decision and order revocation of the designation.14 
If an FTO believes that its circumstances have sufficiently changed “from 
the circumstances that were the basis for the designation,” it may petition the 
Secretary of State to revoke the designation.15 After receiving a petition for 
revocation, the Secretary has 180 days to make a final determination,16 and 
the Secretary must revoke the FTO designation if she determines either that 
“the circumstances that were the basis for the designation have changed in 
such a manner as to warrant revocation,” or that “the national security of the 
United States warrants a revocation.”17 And even if an organization does not 
petition the Secretary for revocation, § 1189 requires the Secretary to make 
this same inquiry for every FTO at least once every five years.18 
In conducting a review of an organization’s FTO designation, the Secretary 
of State must base her decision on a documented administrative record.19 The 
statute is silent as to what must be included in that record. As such, courts have 
recognized that the Secretary’s record may include third-hand accounts, 
information from intelligence sources, open-source information from the 
Internet, and other non-traditional types of evidence—all of which courts may 
struggle to evaluate.20 In addition, the administrative record may include both 
unclassified and classified material.21 Therefore the label “administrative record” 
 
10 See AEDPA, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 301(a)(7), 110 Stat. 1214, 1247 (1996). 
11 § 1189(a)(2)(A)(i). 
12 Id. at (a)(5). 
13 Id. at (a)(6). 
14 Id. at (c). 
15 Id. at (a)(4)(B). In an organization’s petition, it must provide supporting evidence. Id. at (a)(4)(B)(iii). 
16 Id. at (a)(4)(B)(iv)(I). 
17 Id. at (a)(6). 
18 Id. at (a)(4)(C)(i). 
19 Id. at (a)(3)(A). 
20 See People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. U.S. Dep’t of State (People’s Mojahedin I), 182 F.3d 
17, 19 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
21 § 1189(a)(3)(B). 
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may be misleading in that it does not contain the sort of material that “courts and 
agencies [typically] think of as evidence.”22 For that reason, the D.C. Circuit has 
recognized that § 1189 is both substantively and procedurally “unique.”23 
If the Secretary of State denies an FTO’s petition for revocation, § 1189 
provides that the FTO may seek review of the decision in the D.C. Circuit.24 
The standard of review mirrors the standard set forth in the Administrative 
Procedure Act (APA): the court is directed to set aside a decision by the 
Secretary that is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise 
not in accordance with law,” or that lacks “substantial support in the 
administrative record taken as a whole.”25 But importantly, that standard of 
review applies only to the Secretary’s determinations that the organization 
is foreign, and that it either engages or has the capability and intent to 
engage in terrorism—the D.C. Circuit has deemed whether the organization 
poses a threat to U.S. national security an unreviewable political question.26 
After 9/11, America relied more heavily on the FTO designation scheme 
in its fight against terrorism; the number of designated organizations 
increased significantly.27 Today, the FTO designation scheme—and the 
attendant penalties that flow from FTO designation—stand as central 
features of America’s effort to thwart international terrorism.28 
 
22 People’s Mojahedin I, 182 F.3d at 19. 
23 Id.; see also Nat’l Council of Resistance of Iran v. Dep’t of State (Nat’l Council I), 251 F.3d 192, 196 
(D.C. Cir. 2001) (noting that “[w]hile [§ 1189’s] statutory procedure . . . sounds like the familiar procedure 
normally employed by the Congress to afford due process in administrative proceedings, the similarity to 
process afforded in other administrative proceedings ends there” because the designated organization lacks 
the “procedural participation and protection” it would have in other administrative proceedings). 
24 § 1189(c). The exclusive assignment of review in the D.C. Circuit has survived despite 
occasional challenges. See, e.g., United States v. Afshari, 426 F.3d 1150, 1154-55 (9th Cir. 2005) 
(reversing a district court that allowed review outside the D.C. Circuit while noting that similar 
restrictions in other statutes have generally been upheld and that the “scheme avoids the awkwardness 
of criminalizing material support for a designated organization in some circuits but not others”). 
25 See also People’s Mojahedin I, 182 F.3d at 22 (observing § 1189(b)(3) employs “APA-like 
language”). Compare § 1189(c)(3), with 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (2012) (directing a reviewing court 
to set aside agency actions that are “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise 
not in accordance with law,” or that are “unsupported by substantial evidence”). 
26 People’s Mojahedin I, 182 F.3d at 23. 
27 See Donohue, supra note 1, at 654 (“Following 9/11, the number of designated FTOs nearly doubled 
[as Secretary of State Colin Powell re-designated organizations whose designations were set to expire and 
added new organizations to the list] . . . . By April 2008, the number had grown to forty-four.”). 
28 See Foreign Terrorist Organizations, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/
j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm [https://perma.cc/DWJ8-KTJ8] (“FTO designations play a 
critical role in our fight against terrorism and are an effective means of curtailing support for 
terrorist activities and pressuring groups to get out of the terrorism business.”). 
2017] Blacklisting Foreign Terrorist Organizations 219 
B. Criticism of § 1189 
Section 1189 has been the target of much criticism, especially from the legal 
academy. Some have accused the FTO designation scheme of becoming 
“politicized” by the State Department.29 Others have argued that a § 2339B 
“material support” defendant’s inability to challenge the underlying FTO 
designation by the Secretary violates the Constitution.30 The Secretary of State’s 
role in making the determination has also been challenged,31 and the judicial 
review procedures have been attacked as inadequate.32 At least one scholar has 
expressed concern that the FTO designation scheme raises constitutional issues 
under the Equal Protection Clause and substantive due process because of the 
scheme’s “disparate impact on the Arab Muslim community.”33 Another concern 
is that groups—after having their financial assets seized because of the 
designation—may lack the resources to effectively challenge the decision.34 
Yet while § 1189—along with related provisions of law that penalize 
assistance to such groups—has been subject to a great deal of academic 
 
29 E.g., Andrew V. Moshirnia, Valuing Speech and Open Source Intelligence in the Face of Judicial 
Deference, 4 HARV. NAT’L SECURITY J. 385, 405 (2013) (suggesting “political favor, rather than 
actual fact-finding, may determine a group’s designation”); Julie B. Shapiro, The Politicization of 
the Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations: The Effect on the Separation of Powers, 6 CARDOZO 
PUB. L., POL’Y & ETHICS J. 547, 547-48 (2008) (asserting that the FTO designation scheme 
“defies the Constitution” and that it “has become increasingly politicized as the State Department 
picks and chooses which groups to designate as foreign terrorist organizations”). 
30 E.g., Randolph N. Jonakait, A Double Due Process Denial: The Crime of Providing 
Material Support or Resources to Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations, 48 N.Y. L. SCH. L. 
REV. 125, 125 (2003). 
31 E.g., Micah Wyatt, Comment, Designating Terrorist Organizations: Due Process Overdue, 
39 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 221, 245, 259 (2009) (arguing that § 1189 is unconstitutional 
partly because the Secretary of State is not the “unbiased adjudicator” due process requires 
“preside over the organization’s opportunity to be heard prior to the FTO designation”). 
32 E.g., Moshirnia, supra note 29, at 405-06 (pointing out that “[i]n a climate where the Government 
may rely largely on classified (and therefore uncontested) hearsay, there are few, if any, effective 
avenues of correcting or overturning FTO designations through the courts” (footnote omitted)). 
33 See Donohue, supra note 1, at 672-73 (observing that “most of the groups subject to designation orders 
under AEDPA are Arab and/or Muslim” and that “[i]n cases involving the use of secret evidence to support 
allegations of material support to terrorism, almost all of the accused have been Islamic or of Arab descent”). 
34 See Nicole Nice-Petersen, Note, Justice for the “Designated”: The Process That Is Due to Alleged U.S. 
Financiers of Terrorism, 93 GEO. L.J. 1387, 1405 (2005) (arguing that U.S. entities whose assets are frozen 
“are due much greater protections” because they are “unable to mount an effective defense when their 
assets are frozen because blocking orders do not provide adequate notice of the charges against blocked 
entities, and the evidence used to justify blocking orders is often not disclosed to them”). 
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criticism, some commentators have rallied to its defense.35 And, in any 
case, it has enjoyed considerably more success in the courts.36 
As noted above, § 1189 prohibits “a defendant in a criminal action or 
an alien in a removal proceeding” from challenging the underlying FTO 
designation.37 However, individuals prosecuted under § 2339B’s “material 
support” provision have attempted to challenge the underlying FTO 
designation of the group they are charged with supporting—but they have 
not been successful.38 In Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, the Supreme 
Court expanded the scope of the “material support” provision by expressly 
rejecting an as-applied challenge to § 2339B by groups seeking to provide 
international legal training and political advocacy assistance to FTOs.39 
Indeed, AEDPA itself expanded on an earlier definition of “material 
support” by constraining exceptions for medical and religious assistance.40 
As a result of the failure of these challenges to § 1189 and related provisions, 
today’s FTO designation process has wide-ranging ramifications for terrorist 
groups. Professor David Cole, among others, has observed the interplay between 
the § 1189 FTO designation scheme and the § 2339B “material support” provision, 
and noted how the two reinforce one another in America’s war against terrorism.41 
 
35 See Eric Broxmeyer, The Problems of Security and Freedom: Procedural Due Process and the Designation of 
Foreign Terrorist Organizations Under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 22 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 
439, 487 (2004) (concluding that § 1189 “comports with procedural due process so long as designated 
organizations are entitled to post-designation notice and hearings”); see also Ankush Agarwal, Comment, 
Obstructing Justice: The Rise and Fall of the AEDPA, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 839, 899 (2004) (describing AEDPA 
as “a necessary tool” in the fight against terrorism, and arguing that it “provides sufficient safeguards to assure 
that the constitutional rights of loyal American citizens . . . will not be compromised,” though acknowledging 
that “the rights of active donors and participants [in terrorist organizations] may” be). 
36 See Shapiro, supra note 29, at 548 (observing “courts generally have been reluctant to scrutinize the 
designations and to invade what they consider the province of the Executive Branch” and that, as a result, “the 
Executive Branch now wields a tremendous amount of power to designate foreign organizations as terrorists”). 
37 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(8) (2012). 
38 See, e.g., United States v. Afshari, 426 F.3d 1150, 1158 (9th Cir. 2005). 
39 See 561 U.S. 1, 36 (2010). 
40 See Donohue, supra note 1, at 652-53 (noting AEDPA effectively expanded the definition 
of material support by replacing an exception for “humanitarian assistance to persons not 
directly involved in [such] violations” with the phrase “except medicine or religious materials”). 
41 See David Cole, The New McCarthyism: Repeating History in the War on Terrorism, 38 HARV. 
C.R.–C.L. L. REV. 1, 8-9 (2003) (“Virtually every criminal ‘terrorism’ case that the government 
has filed since September 11 has included a charge that the defendant provided material support 
to a terrorist organization.”); see also Wyatt, supra note 31, at 256 n.261 (“[T]here is 
tremendous pressure to designate as many organizations as FTOs as possible, because the 
only way to prevent ‘material support’ to these organizations is to predesignate them.”). 
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C. Role of Classified Information in § 1189 
Section 1189 provides that the Secretary of State “may consider 
classified information” in reaching her decision to designate an FTO.42 
Section 1189 further specifies that such “[c]lassified information shall not 
be subject to disclosure for such time as it remains classified.”43 
In subsequent judicial proceedings challenging an FTO designation, the 
court is directed to conduct its review “based solely upon the administrative 
record.”44 The Government is allowed to provide, for ex parte and in camera 
review by the court, any classified information that was used by the Secretary 
in making her decision.45 As noted above, the standard of review set forth in 
§ 1189 is similar to that used in review of administrative proceedings: the 
court is authorized to set aside the Secretary’s decision only when it “lack[s] 
substantial support in the administrative record taken as a whole or in classified 
information submitted to the court.”46 Thus by its terms § 1189 directs the court 
to uphold a determination by the Secretary when substantial support for the 
designation exists in the classified record, regardless of whether the 
unclassified portion of the record also contains supportive information. 
Section 1189 does not provide any mechanism by which an FTO 
challenging the Secretary’s decision may gain access to classified 
information—either in original form or in any modified form. Thus, as the 
D.C. Circuit has recognized, any classified material on which the Secretary 
based her decision to designate an organization “may continue to remain 
secret, except from certain members of Congress and this court.”47 
II. A RECURRING ISSUE: RELIANCE ON CLASSIFIED  
INFORMATION IN FTO DESIGNATIONS 
The law governing the designation of FTOs developed almost entirely in the 
D.C. Circuit, owing to that court’s exclusive responsibility to review the Secretary 
of State’s designation determinations. That body of law in turn developed largely 
from challenges by a handful of organizations to their FTO designations—most 
notably an Iranian resistance group known as the People’s Mojahedin Organization 
of Iran (People’s Mojahedin). This Part will examine a series of challenges made by 
People’s Mojahedin and a few other organizations to their FTO designations, with 
a focus on the role that classified information played in those challenges. 
 
42 § 1189(a)(3)(B). 
43 Id. 
44 Id. at (c)(2). 
45 Id. 
46 Id. at (c)(3)(D) (emphasis added); see also supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
47 People’s Mojahedin I, 182 F.3d 17, 19 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
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A. People’s Mojahedin I 
In what would prove to be a long journey to shed its FTO 
designation,48 People’s Mojahedin made its first visit to the D.C. Circuit 
in October 1997.49 Together with the separatist Liberation Tigers of Tamil 
Eelam (Tamil Tigers)—both of which had been designated as FTOs by 
Secretary of State Madeline Albright50—People’s Mojahedin challenged 
its designation,51 which placed it alongside notorious organizations like 
Shining Path, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC), 
Khmer Rouge, and Hizballah.52 
Confronting People’s Mojahedin’s FTO challenge for the first time, the 
court acknowledged that the language of § 1189 was couched in administrative 
law terminology, but nonetheless recognized that the scheme was unlike a 
“run-of-the-mill administrative proceeding.”53 The court also observed that the 
information relied upon by the Secretary in making her designation, and 
included in her administrative record, “may or may not be facts” because § 1189 
plainly did not prevent the Secretary from using “third hand accounts, press 
stories, material on the Internet or other hearsay regarding the organization’s 
activities.”54 The public record used by the Secretary included information about 
the Tamil Tigers gathered from the news media, Sri Lankan intelligence units, 
the U.S. military, and the State Department.55 For People’s Mojahedin, the 
Secretary relied heavily on a Central Intelligence Agency research paper.56 
Due to the fact that both People’s Mojahedin and the Tamil Tigers were 
clearly foreign entities—with no property and no presence in the United States 
whatsoever—the court easily concluded that neither organization had any 
constitutional due process rights.57 The court reasoned that organizations are 
only entitled to due process after they both “come within the territory of the 
United States” and develop “substantial connections” with the United States.58 
Consequently, People’s Mojahedin and the Tamil Tigers were only allowed to 
 
48 See Foreign Terrorist Organizations, supra note 28 (referring to People’s Mojahedin by its 
alternate name, the Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization, and noting it was not removed from the FTO 
list until September 28, 2012). 
49 People’s Mojahedin I, 182 F.3d 17, petition for review filed, No. 30-4406 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 22, 1997). 
50 Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations, 62 Fed. Reg. 52,650 (Oct. 8, 1997). 
51 People’s Mojahedin I, 182 F.3d at 18-19. 
52 Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations, 62 Fed. Reg. at 52,650-51. 
53 People’s Mojahedin I, 182 F.3d at 19. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. at 19-20. 
56 Id. at 20. 
57 Id. at 22. 
58 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 
U.S. 259, 271 (1990)). 
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contest the Secretary of State’s designations under the procedures specified in 
§ 1189—in other words, the statutory rights that Congress chose to provide.59 
Turning to the statutory text, the court identified a problem with 
§ 1189: the Secretary’s finding under § 1189(a)(1)(C) that an organization 
“threatens the security of United States nationals or the national security 
of the United States” is a nonjusticiable political question, despite the fact 
that Congress apparently directed the court to review that finding.60 To 
avoid wading into the political arena, the court confined its review to the 
Secretary’s findings that the organizations were “foreign,” and that they 
either engage in terrorism or have the ability and intent to do so.61 
Without the need to address any constitutional challenges, the court 
concluded that the “administrative record” supplied by the Secretary of State 
contained “substantial support” for her findings.62 In so holding, the court 
recognized that the information in the record had not been “subjected to 
adversary testing, and there was no opportunity for counter-evidence by the 
organizations affected,” but the court nonetheless performed what it 
considered to be its very limited function under the statutory terms of § 1189.63 
B. National Council I 
People’s Mojahedin made its second trip to the D.C. Circuit in November 
1999, this time alongside the National Council of Resistance of Iran, which the 
Secretary had deemed an “alias” of People’s Mojahedin.64 The challenge was 
to the Secretary of State’s October 1999 redesignation of People’s Mojahedin 
as an FTO.65 The court concluded that the Secretary had complied with § 1189 
in making her redesignation, but that the redesignation nonetheless violated 
the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.66 
The National Council I court, like the People’s Mojahedin I court before 
it, noted that the statutory terms of § 1189 make no provision for the 
designated organization “to access, comment on, or contest the critical 
material,” and that therefore “the entity does not have the benefit of 
meaningful adversary proceedings on any of the statutory grounds.”67 
This time around, however, the court determined that the organizations 
did have sufficient contacts with the United States to invoke procedural 
 
59 Id. 
60 Id. at 23. 
61 Id. at 24. 
62 Id. at 24-25. 
63 Id. 
64 Nat’l Council I, 251 F.3d 192, 197 (D.C. Cir. 2001), petition for review filed, No. 99-1439 (Nov. 8, 1999). 
65 See Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations, 64 Fed. Reg. 55,112 (Oct. 8, 1999). 
66 Nat’l Council I, 251 F.3d at 196. 
67 Id. at 197 (emphasis added). 
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due process protection under the Fifth Amendment: National Council’s 
ownership of a “small bank account” in the U.S., and its presence at the 
National Press Building in Washington, D.C.68 And because the 
Government argued People’s Mojahedin and National Council were 
effectively the same organization, the court determined both organizations 
had constitutional presence.69 
Having decided the organizations were entitled to procedural due process, the 
court next considered whether the organizations were denied it. The court looked 
to Paul v. Davis, a 1976 Supreme Court case holding the stigmatic injury resulting 
from police officers distributing flyers with the plaintiff ’s name and photo was 
insufficient to trigger a due process violation.70 The Paul Court distinguished an 
earlier case, Wisconsin v. Constantineau, which held posting a notice prohibiting the 
sale of liquor to a plaintiff accused of excessive drinking did amount to a procedural 
due process violation since—in addition to imposing a stigmatic injury—the 
notice deprived the plaintiff of his right to purchase liquor without a hearing.71 In 
like manner, because People’s Mojahedin and National Council suffered more 
than just stigmatic injury as a result of their designation, the National Council I 
court found the situation of the FTOs more analogous to Constantineau, and thus 
concluded a procedural due process violation had occurred.72 
But the court’s analysis was not complete: it next considered what process 
was due and when it was due.73 The court quoted Mathews v. Eldridge’s 
famous three-factor test for identifying the relevant considerations: 
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, 
the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest of the procedure used, 
and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural 
safeguards; and finally, the government’s interest, including the function 
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or 
substitute procedural requirement would entail.74 
In light of the Mathews factors, the National Council I court weighed the 
interests on both sides and held the Secretary had to provide both notice and access 
to the unclassified record on which her decision was to be based.75 Still, recognizing 
“the foreign policy and national security concerns” presented by the designations, 
the court left the designations of People’s Mojahedin and National Council in place 
 
68 Id. at 201. 
69 Id. at 202. 
70 424 U.S. 693, 712. 
71 Id. at 707-09 (discussing 400 U.S. 433 (1971)). 
72 Nat’l Council I, 251 F.3d at 204. 
73 Id. at 205-09. 
74 Id. at 206 (quoting 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)). 
75 Id. at 208-09. 
2017] Blacklisting Foreign Terrorist Organizations 225 
and remanded to the Secretary to provide the required process.76 Thus, unlike their 
first attempt, the organizations’ second trip to the D.C. Circuit resulted in the first 
layer of judicial gloss being applied to the § 1189 FTO designation scheme. 
C. People’s Mojahedin II 
After the D.C. Circuit remanded the designations of People’s 
Mojahedin and National Council to the Secretary of State with directions 
to make the unclassified record available to the organizations to contest, 
the Secretary re-entered the FTO designation in September 2001 and 
subsequently entered another two-year designation in October 2001.77 
Back in court to challenge the Secretary’s redesignation, People’s Mojahedin 
attacked the use of classified information by the Secretary, arguing that use of 
such material prevented People’s Mojahedin from “effectively defend[ing]” 
against the Secretary’s determination.78 Analyzing this argument, the court 
considered the two justiciable elements required for FTO designation: (1) that 
the organization is foreign; and (2) that it either engages or has the capability 
and intent to engage in terrorism.79 With respect to the first, the court dismissed 
the classified information argument out-of-hand, noting that “there is not and 
cannot be any dispute” about the foreign status of People’s Mojahedin.80 In other 
words, the use of classified information for this element was not needed. 
For the second element, however, the court recognized a “colorable 
argument” to the contrary.81 Looking to language in Abourezk v. Reagan 
stating that “the firmly held main rule [of our adversary system] that a court 
may not dispose of the merits of a case on the basis of ex parte, in camera 
submissions,”82 the court recognized that § 1189’s provision for ex parte and 
in camera submissions to the tribunal was arguably problematic.83 
In analyzing this argument, however, the court equivocated. Essentially 
relying on National Council I, the court simply stated that because the 
Secretary complied with the requirements specified in that case—notice and 
a chance to be meaningfully heard—nothing more was required.84 Yet in 
reaching this conclusion, the court proceeded to offer two statements that 
are seemingly in tension. First, the court recounted its National Council I 
 
76 Id. at 209. 
77 People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. Dep’t of State (People’s Mojahedin II), 327 F.3d 
1238, 1241 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
78 Id. at 1241-42. 
79 Id. at 1241-44 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(1)(A)–(C) (2012)). 
80 Id. at 1242. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. (citing 785 F.2d 1043, 1061 (D.C. Cir. 1986)). 
83 Id. 
84 Id. at 1242-43. 
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decision, asserting that case “decided . . . due process required the disclosure 
of only the unclassified portions of the administrative record.”85 
But then, in the paragraph immediately following, the court rendered 
that analysis dicta by flatly concluding that “even the unclassified record 
taken alone is quite adequate to support the Secretary’s determination . . . . 
that the organization engages in terrorist activities.”86 Indeed, the court 
stated that even if no classified information had been provided to the court 
at all, it still would have concluded the Secretary’s decision satisfied the 
“substantial support” standard based on the unclassified record.87 
D. Holy Land Foundation v. Ashcroft 
In April 2003, a Muslim charity known as the Holy Land Foundation, 
which had been incorporated first in California and then in Texas, brought suit 
in the D.C. Circuit challenging its designation as a terrorist group.88 Holy 
Land Foundation had been designated a “Specially Designated Global 
Terrorist” under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act 
(IEEPA)—a scheme similar to the FTO designation process.89 Its designation 
resulted from President Bush’s response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks and was 
based largely on information that the organization was “closely linked to 
Hamas.”90 As the result of a Treasury Department order that flowed from the 
designation, Holy Land Foundation’s assets were blocked.91 
After concluding the Treasury Department’s designation of Holy Land 
Foundation satisfied the standard of review required under the APA, the 
D.C. Circuit considered the organization’s due process argument.92 Applying 
the procedural requirements articulated in National Council I, the court 
assessed whether the organization received notice and an opportunity to be 
meaningfully heard.93 Observing that the Treasury Department notified 
Holy Land Foundation of its intent to issue a redesignation and gave it 
 
85 Id. at 1242. 
86 Id. at 1243 (emphasis added). 
87 Id. at 1244 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1189(c)(3)(D) (2012)). 
88 Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 156, 159-60 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
89 Id. (explaining IEEPA “authorizes the President to declare a national emergency when 
an extraordinary threat to the United States arises that originates in substantial part in a foreign 
state” and, in the course of such an emergency, to specially designate entities as terrorist groups, 
a designation that “carries similar implications” to a designation under § 1189). IEEPA, Pub. L. 
No. 95-223, 91 Stat. 1625 (1977) is codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1707 (2012). 
90 Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev., 333 F.3d at 159-60. 
91 Id. at 160. 
92 Id. at 162-63 (stating the “Treasury’s decision to designate [Holy Land Foundation] . . . 
was based on ample evidence in a massive administrative record” and was “clearly rational”). 
93 Id. at 163-64. 
2017] Blacklisting Foreign Terrorist Organizations 227 
thirty-one days to respond to evidence linking the organization to Hamas, 
the court held the Department complied with procedural due process.94 
Like § 1189, IEEPA—under which Holy Land Foundation had been 
designated—makes provision for ex parte and in camera submission of classified 
information to the court in judicial review proceedings.95 Referring to the dicta 
from People’s Mojahedin II, the Holy Land Foundation court recalled that it had 
recently rejected a claim that ex parte and in camera submission of classified 
material violated due process.96 But the court explained it “makes no difference” 
that the decisions were made under different designation schemes and that 
therefore Holy Land Foundation’s argument “that due process prevents its 
designation based upon classified information to which it has not had access is of 
no avail.”97 Only a few paragraphs later in its opinion, however, the court stated 
that “[t]he ample record evidence (particularly taking into account the classified 
information presented to the court in camera) establishing [Holy Land Foundation’s] 
role in the funding of Hamas and of its terrorist activities is incontrovertible.”98 
It would thus appear that the court reached a question which it had not 
previously had occasion to address—whether the submission of ex parte and in 
camera evidence comports with the Fifth Amendment’s due process 
requirement. Unlike People’s Mojahedin II, in which enough support for the 
Secretary of State’s designation was clearly furnished by the unclassified record 
standing alone (rendering the court’s discussion of the Fifth Amendment 
hypothetical) here the court was confronted with a situation in which the 
classified record apparently furnished at least a very significant basis for the 
terrorist designation. Additionally, here the court first addressed, and rejected, 
Holy Land Foundation’s statutory arguments under the APA before reaching the 
constitutional due process question. Because Holy Land Foundation’s APA claim 
failed, the court necessarily reached—and answered—the constitutional question.99 
E. National Council II 
After the D.C. Circuit’s 2001 remand to the Secretary of State in 
National Council I—where the court upheld the joint designations of 
People’s Mojahedin and of National Council as an alias, but found 
procedural due process violations in the § 1189 scheme—the Secretary 
 
94 Id. at 164. 
95 See 50 U.S.C. § 1702(c) (2012). 
96 Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev., 333 F.3d at 164 (citing 327 F.3d 1238, 1242 (D.C. Cir. 
2003)). 
97 Id. 
98 Id. at 165 (emphasis added). 
99 See also Kadi v. Geithner, 42 F. Supp. 3d 1, 5, 29 (D.D.C. 2012) (interpreting Holy 
Land Foundation to have “squarely rejected the proposition that due process requires . . . . 
[an] automatic right to access classified evidence”). 
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decided to retain National Council’s FTO designation.100 In November 
2001, National Council returned to court to challenge that decision.101 
Following the court’s earlier remand, both People’s Mojahedin and National 
Council “availed themselves of [the] opportunities” to rebut the Secretary’s 
unclassified record and argue the evidence.102 Despite that effort, in October 2001 
the Secretary of State redesignated National Council as an alias of People’s 
Mojahedin, though he noted he would review that determination de novo after 
reviewing further submissions from National Council and from the intelligence 
community.103 By May 2003 the Secretary decided to retain the alias designation.104 
The administrative record by now contained largely the same materials 
from National Council’s earlier designation challenge along with new materials 
added by the Secretary and by National Council.105 After reviewing the record, 
the court determined that the Secretary still had enough information to justify 
his decision.106 Looking to the laws of agency, the court reasoned that the 
crucial question in assessing the alias designation was whether the Secretary of 
State had enough information to conclude People’s Mojahedin “so dominates 
and controls [National Council] that the latter can no longer be considered 
meaningfully independent from the former.”107 
In answering that question, the court reviewed both the classified and 
unclassified records.108 Although the court declined to disclose information 
gleaned from the classified material submitted ex parte and in camera, the 
court noted that “the voluminous unclassified materials contained in the 
administrative record by themselves and by a comfortable margin provide 
sufficient support for the Secretary’s conclusion.”109 Among the unclassified 
information supporting the Secretary’s determination was an FBI report 
stating National Council functioned as a political wing for People’s Mojahedin, 
as well as evidence that the organizations had overlapping leadership.110 
Having found that the Secretary had substantial support in the record to 
justify the alias finding, the court next proceeded—necessarily—to consider 
National Council’s constitutional challenge. National Council argued due process 
 
100 Nat’l Council of Resistance of Iran v. Dep’t of State (Nat’l Council II), 373 F.3d 152, 153-54 
(D.C. Cir. 2004). 
101 Id., petition for review filed, No. 01-1480 (Nov. 2, 2001). 
102 Id. at 155. 
103 Redesignation of Foreign Terrorist Organization, 66 Fed. Reg. 51,088 (Oct. 5, 2001). 
104 Nat’l Council II, 373 F.3d at 156. 
105 Id. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. at 158. 
108 Id. 
109 Id. (emphasis added). 
110 Id. at 159. 
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required access to the classified record and the ability to confront witnesses.111 
Rejecting National Council’s request, the court reiterated its position from 
People’s Mojahedin II, stating that the National Council I process requirements 
“established the constitutional baseline for fair process.”112 But, as in People’s 
Mojahedin II, the court need not have ventured an analysis of the constitutionality 
of ex parte and in camera classified information submissions under § 1189 because 
such analysis—by its own clear assessment—was not necessary to resolve the case. 
Having found unclassified information sufficient to support the Secretary’s 
determination, the court should have held its tongue.113 
F. People’s Mojahedin III 
Following National Council II, Congress amended § 1189 by eliminating 
the need for the Secretary to redesignate an organization every two years.114 
In its third and final challenge to its designation, People’s Mojahedin filed 
a petition in July 2008 asking the Secretary to review its most recent 
redesignation.115 It argued that revocation was warranted by “dramatically 
changed circumstances” in the organization’s activities.116 Specifically, 
People’s Mojahedin asserted it had taken a number of actions, including that 
it “ceased its military campaign against the Iranian regime and renounced 
violence,” “shared intelligence with the U.S. government regarding Iran’s 
nuclear program,” and had also been removed from the United Kingdom’s list 
of terrorist groups.117 The Secretary denied the petition.118 
During her review of the petition, the Secretary provided People’s 
Mojahedin with a “heavily redacted 20-page administrative summary of 
State’s review of the record, which . . . referred to 33 exhibits, many of which 
were also heavily or entirely redacted.”119 She also only notified People’s 
Mojahedin one day prior to the redesignation’s publication in the Federal 
 
111 Id. at 159. 
112 Id. (citing 327 F.3d 1238, 1242 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (citing 251 F.3d 192, 208 (D.C. Cir. 2003))). 
113 Two years later, the court confronted another FTO challenge in which it declined 
to address the same attempt to access classified information. See Chai v. Dep’t of State, 466 
F.3d 125, 127 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (declining to resolve a claim that the Secretary’s use of 
classified information violated due process because the court was able to “uphold the 
designations based solely upon the unclassified portion of the administrative record”). 
114 See Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-
458, § 7119, 118 Stat. 3638, 3801 (2004). 
115 People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. U.S. Dep’t of State (People’s Mojahedin III), 613 
F.3d 220, 225 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
116 Id. 
117 Id. 
118 Id. (citing In the Matter of the Review of the Designation of Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization 
(MEK), and All Designated Aliases, as a Foreign Terrorist Organization Upon Petition Filed Pursuant to 
Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as Amended, 74 Fed. Reg. 1273, 1274 (Jan. 12, 2009)). 
119 Id. at 226. 
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Register, and did not give the organization access to even the unclassified 
record.120 In its suit before the D.C. Circuit, People’s Mojahedin again 
asserted that the record lacked substantial support and also claimed several 
procedural violations: failure to give advance notice; failure to provide the 
unclassified record; and failure to disclose the classified record.121 
The court agreed that due process had been violated and thus remanded to the 
Secretary.122 Recognizing the Secretary had failed to provide even the basic notice 
and access to the unclassified record required by National Council I, the court 
determined that it need not even consider whether the administrative record 
contained substantial support for the designation. It reasoned that because the 
Secretary only told People’s Mojahedin of the pending designation the day before 
it was made, the organization only had a chance to contest the record once the 
decision was already finalized.123 The court also indicated that in some instances 
the Secretary noted that a particular piece of information was “credible,” but did 
not specify the element of the determination to which it was relevant, leaving the 
court unable to effectively review the record for substantial support.124 
On remand, the court instructed the Secretary to give People’s Mojahedin an 
opportunity to contest the unclassified record, but emphasized that § 1189 does 
not provide an opportunity for the organization to access the classified record.125 
However—perhaps aware of the fact that, as discussed above, much of the court’s 
precedent purporting to bar any access to the classified record was unquestionably 
dicta—the court also stated that its precedent “suggested that this procedure can 
satisfy due process requirements, at least where the Secretary has not relied critically 
on classified material and the unclassified material provided to the FTO is 
sufficient to justify the designation.”126 In other words, the court determined that 
the classified record could be withheld—at least where it didn’t matter, anyway. 
The court explained that “none of the AEDPA cases decides [sic] 
whether an administrative decision relying critically on undisclosed classified 
material would comport with due process because in none was the classified 
record essential to uphold an FTO designation.”127 In somewhat cryptic 
terms, the court concluded that a grant of access to the unclassified record 




122 Id. at 222. 
123 Id. at 228 (“[W]e have held due process requires that the [organization] be notified 
of the unclassified material on which the Secretary proposes to rely and an opportunity to 
respond to that material before its redesignation . . . .”). 
124 Id. at 230. 
125 Id. at 230-31. 
126 Id. (emphasis added). 
127 Id. at 231. 
128 Id. (emphasis added). 
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In attempting to convince the court that her failure to give adequate notice 
and access to the unclassified record was harmless error, the Secretary asserted the 
“heart” of the basis for the designation was in the classified record—her logic being 
that such information “could not have been shared in any event,” making the 
procedural error inconsequential.129 But the court rejected that argument on the 
grounds that the State Department had previously conceded the Secretary used 
the “whole” record—both classified and unclassified—in reaching her decision.130 
In a concurring opinion, Judge Henderson agreed the case should be remanded 
to the Secretary, but only because the Secretary had conceded that she had relied 
on the “whole” record and People’s Mojahedin had not had access to the 
unclassified record.131 Thus the Secretary’s own admission, or suggestion, that the 
unclassified record had some bearing on her decision is what justified the remand 
for Judge Henderson. Having reviewed the classified part of the record during 
litigation, Judge Henderson believed the classified record alone provided the 
substantial support needed to sustain the designation, and stated that she would 
have affirmed the designation if the Secretary had merely stated that she relied only 
on the classified record.132 Expressing disagreement with the other judges on the 
panel, Judge Henderson read the precedent to have “repeatedly emphasized” that 
the designated organization has no right to access classified information under any 
circumstances.133 For support, she pointed to National Council II, although she 
recognized that court “acknowledged later in [its] opinion that the unclassified 
record alone would have sufficed to support the designation.”134 
III. CLOSING THE FILE: WHY EX PARTE, IN CAMERA  
SUBMISSIONS SATISFY DUE PROCESS 
Against the backdrop of case law surveyed in Part II, this Part employs three 
lines of inquiry to assess whether the crucial reliance on classified information by 
the Secretary of State satisfies due process under the Fifth Amendment. First, it 
critically evaluates the relevant precedent discussed in Part II. Next, it analyzes 
the issue using conventional due process principles by considering the interests 
implicated by FTO designation and the procedural requirements necessary to 
protect them. Finally, this Part considers two other situations that illuminate the 
analysis by way of comparison: the Government’s blacklisting of subversive 
 
129 Id. at 228-29; see also Brief for Respondents at 45-46, People’s Mojahedin III, 613 F.3d 
220 (No. 09-1059) (arguing that any error in failing to disclose the record was harmless 
because “the intelligence information at the heart of the Secretary’s decision is classified 
and could not have been shared with [People’s Mojahedin] anyway”). 
130 People’s Mojahedin III, 613 F.3d at 228-29. 
131 Id. at 232 (Henderson, J., concurring). 
132 Id. at 231-32. 
133 Id. at 231. 
134 Id. (citing 251 F.3d 192, 202, 208-09 (D.C. Cir. 2001)). 
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organizations following the Second World War; and the Government’s more 
recent use of classified information in post-9/11 habeas corpus proceedings. 
A. As-Applied Challenges Have Been Foreclosed by Circuit Precedent 
In its final appearance before the D.C. Circuit, People’s Mojahedin argued 
that although the court had previously rejected arguments that § 1189 was 
facially unconstitutional, it nonetheless had never “considered an as-applied 
challenge where the entire basis for the Secretary’s conclusion lies . . . in the 
undisclosed portion of the record.”135 As noted earlier, the court apparently 
accepted this statement when it asserted that “none of the AEDPA cases 
decides [sic] whether an administrative decision relying critically on 
undisclosed classified material would comport with due process because in 
none was the classified record essential to uphold an FTO designation.”136 
However, the Government clearly thought the matter settled, arguing that 
the court had “repeatedly rejected arguments by [designated organizations] 
that disclosure of classified information in challenges to specific designations 
was necessary to avoid running afoul of the Due Process Clause.”137 
As noted earlier in Sections II.A–C, the court’s disposition of People’s Mojahedin 
I never reached constitutional due process because the court found the organization 
hadn’t established constitutional presence in the United States. No clear rule can 
be discerned from National Council I either, because in that case the court provided 
no indication of how important the classified information was to upholding the 
Secretary’s determination. Likewise, no clear disposition was offered by People’s 
Mojahedin II. Although the court there properly reached constitutional due process, 
the court itself rendered its discussion on the requirement of access to classified 
information dicta when it observed “even the unclassified record taken alone” in 
that case was “quite adequate to support the Secretary’s determination.”138 
But despite statements to the contrary by the People’s Mojahedin III court, the 
D.C. Circuit appears to have already foreclosed the argument that designated 
FTOs must be given access to the classified record—either in full or in part—in 
order to satisfy constitutional due process, even where the designation hinges on 
the classified material. In Holy Land Foundation, while analyzing the argument that 
due process requires disclosure of the classified record on which the designation 
 
135 Brief for Petitioner at 54, People’s Mojahedin III, 613 F.3d 220 (No. 09-1059); see also Reply 
Brief for Petitioner at 13-14, People’s Mojahedin III, 613 F.3d 220 (No. 09-1059) (“In previous 
appeals, the Court concluded that the public record contained substantial support for the 
Secretary’s conclusion. Here, by contrast, the Government acknowledges that the Secretary’s 
conclusion rests primarily on the classified portion of the record.” (citations omitted)). 
136 People’s Mojahedin III, 613 F.3d at 231 (emphasis added). 
137 Brief for Respondents, supra note 129, at 37. 
138 People’s Mojahedin II, 327 F.3d 1238, 1243 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
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determination was based, the court recognized that “[t]he ample record evidence 
(particularly taking into account the classified information presented to the court in camera) 
establishing [Holy Land Foundation’s] . . . terrorist activities is incontrovertible.”139 
Key to resolving the question of whether the court definitively resolved 
the issue of FTO access to classified information in Holy Land Foundation is 
knowing how essential the classified record was to the designation decision in 
that case. Although the answer may be open to some dispute, the court’s 
characterization of the significance of the classified record—“particularly 
taking into account”140—strongly suggests that the classified record at least 
seriously bolstered the Secretary’s determination. To use the People’s 
Mojahedin III court’s language, the question is whether the unclassified 
information was “sufficient” to uphold the designation—or, put differently, 
whether the classified record was “essential to uphold an FTO designation.”141 
National Council II provides little guidance. There, the court again 
acknowledged that “the voluminous unclassified materials contained in the 
administrative record by themselves and by a comfortable margin provide[d] 
sufficient support for the Secretary’s conclusion, given the standard of review.”142 
Although the court did assert the requirements of constitutional due process had 
been conclusively established by National Council I and People’s Mojahedin II, the 
court’s description of the criticality—or lack thereof—of classified information in 
supporting the FTO designation rendered those statements dicta. Indeed, 
People’s Mojahedin argued just that in a brief to the court during its third 
challenge.143 The Government’s contrary assertion that the issue had already been 
foreclosed by People’s Mojahedin I and II appears to be plainly incorrect.144 
Although the Government may have relied on the wrong authorities, it 
nonetheless appears to have stumbled upon the correct answer in its People’s 
Mojahedin III brief. A close analysis of the D.C. Circuit’s cases dealing with 
terrorist designations probably forecloses any access to classified information in a 
future as-applied challenge. Only Holy Land Foundation produced a binding 
answer to a due process challenge that was properly reached, and only in that case 
 
139 Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 156, 165-66 (D.C. Cir. 2003) 
(emphasis added). Since the court had resolved the Foundation’s statutory arguments in favor of the 
Government, this point was a necessary part of the court’s holding. And while Holy Land 
Foundation ostensibly dealt with IEEPA, the court made clear that the distinction “makes no 
difference” for the constitutional due process analysis. Id. at 164. 
140 Id. at 165-66. 
141 People’s Mojahedin III, 613 F.3d at 230-31. 
142 Nat’l Council II, 373 F.3d 152, 158 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (emphasis added). 
143 See Reply Brief for Petitioner, supra note 135, at 23 (arguing previous statements by the 
court “regarding access to classified information constituted dictum because the unclassified 
portion of the record sufficed . . . to establish substantial support for the Secretary’s decision”). 
144 See Brief for Respondents, supra note 129, at 37-38 (arguing National Council I held 
arguments in favor of access to classified information were foreclosed by People’s Mojahedin I and II). 
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did the court face an actual scenario in which a designated organization was 
challenging a determination based—depending on how one reads the court’s 
opinion—essentially on classified material. As one panel of the D.C. Circuit cannot 
overrule another panel’s prior decision,145 the Holy Land Foundation court’s denial 
of access to classified information—even where that classified information was 
apparently crucial to the designation—is binding precedent in the D.C. Circuit. 
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia recently 
confronted the classified information disclosure issue once again in Fares v. 
Smith,146 a case in which several foreign individuals designated as “Specially 
Designated Narcotics Traffickers” under a scheme similar to § 1189147 mounted a 
due process challenge to the sufficiency of a “redacted administrative record” 
provided by the Government.148 Although this redacted record failed to provide 
much information at all, the court found that “two unredacted summaries of 
privileged information” which the Government subsequently provided contained 
enough information to justify the designation.149 The court thus looked to Holy 
Land Foundation and National Council I and concluded that the plaintiffs had been 
“afforded sufficient procedural due process under the circumstances.”150 The court 
recognized that the D.C. Circuit in People’s Mojahedin III suggested a theoretical 
“limit” to the Government’s ability to withhold classified material and posited that 
a scenario in which no information was released would not be constitutional.151 But 
the court held that so long as the divulged record provided the designated entity 
enough to “effectively rebut” the basis for the designation, due process is 
satisfied.152 And because the divulged, unredacted record in Fares clearly contained 
sufficient grounds to uphold the designations at issue,153 any classified information 
withheld does not appear to have been crucial to the designation decision. 
 
145 See, e.g., LaShawn A. v. Barry, 87 F.3d 1389, 1391 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (en banc) (“[W]e 
granted rehearing in banc to decide whether one panel of this court may reconsider a prior 
panel’s decision . . . . The answer is no.”). 
146 No. 16-1730-CKK, 2017 WL 1319716 (D.D.C. Apr. 7, 2017). 
147 The plaintiffs had been designated by the Department of the Treasury under the Foreign 
Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 1901–1908 (2012). That Act authorizes the designation 
of “any foreign person that plays a significant role in international narcotics trafficking.” § 1907(7). 
Designation carries significant consequences, including blocking of assets “owned or controlled by” the 
individual. § 1904(b). The Act provides for ex parte, in camera submissions to the court. § 1903(i). 
148 2017 WL 1319716, at *1-2. 
149 Id. at *6-8. 
150 Id. at *4-5 (citing 333 F.3d 156 (D.C. Cir. 2003); 251 F.3d 192 (D.C. Cir. 2001)). For the sake 
of its due process analysis, the court simply assumed that the designated individuals would be entitled 
to constitutional due process protection, although they were foreign nationals. Id. For further 
discussion of that antecedent question in the context of FTO designations, see infra subsection III.B.1. 
151 Id. at *5-8 (citing 613 F.3d 220 (D.C. Cir. 2010)). 
152 Id. at *8. 
153 Id. (noting that one of the redacted summaries provided plaintiffs much information 
about “the illicit activities in which . . . they are engaged; how and where they purportedly 
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B. Due Process Analysis 
The Fifth Amendment provides that no person shall “be deprived of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law.”154 Determining whether 
government action has complied with the latter requirement entails two 
steps: First, a court must determine whether a protected interest—life, 
liberty, or property—has been implicated.155 Second, the court must consider 
the various interests of the parties at stake and identify the specific procedures 
that are constitutionally necessary to protect the implicated interest.156 
To decide “whether due process requirements apply in the first place,” the 
first step of the analysis focuses the court’s attention on “the nature of the 
interest at stake.”157 Although liberty and property are “broad and majestic 
terms”158 that defy easy definition, the Supreme Court has provided guidance 
to make the analysis more manageable. Liberty encompasses the innumerable 
rights bound up in the pursuit of personal happiness and professional 
success.159 The ability to work, raise a family, and travel, for instance, all clearly 
implicate protected liberty interests. 
Property interests also “take many forms.”160 Surveying several prior decisions, 
the Roth Court distilled several “attributes” of protected property interests.161 To 
qualify as a protected property interest, “more than an abstract need or desire” for 
the benefit is required, as is “more than a unilateral expectation” of the benefit.162 
Recognizing that the purpose of property is to “protect those claims upon which 
people rely in their daily lives,” the Court held that “a legitimate claim of 
entitlement” is required before a property interest is subject to the protections of 
due process.163 Moreover, in determining whether a person has a legitimate claim 
of entitlement to support a protected property interest, it is important to 
understand that “[p]roperty interests . . . are not created by the Constitution” but 
 
engaged in those activities; during which time periods; for which entities[;] . . . and the 
relationship between Plaintiffs and others implicated in the purportedly illicit activities”). 
154 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
155 See, e.g., Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569-71 (1972) 
(explaining that only if a protected interest is implicated will the court weigh the interests 
at stake and determine what specific procedures due process requires). 
156 Id. 
157 Id. at 570-71 (emphasis added) (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)). 
158 Id. at 571. 
159 See id. at 572 (describing liberty as including “generally . . . those privileges long 
recognized . . . as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men” (second omission 
in original) (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923))). 
160 Id. at 576. 
161 Id. at 577. 
162 Id. 
163 Id. 
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are instead “created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or 
understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law.”164 
In the second step of the analysis, the reviewing court must weigh the public 
and private interests involved to discern the required procedural protections. 
Mathews v. Eldridge famously articulated the three main factors for 
consideration: the private interest affected by the Government’s action; the 
“risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, 
and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards”; 
and the Government’s interest, including “the fiscal and administrative burdens 
that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.”165 
As is frequently observed, the dictates of due process are not fixed for all 
scenarios. Rather, “due process is flexible and calls for such procedural 
protections as the particular situation demands.”166 Mathews made clear, 
however, that “[t]he fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity 
to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’”167 Still, the 
Supreme Court has recognized that although due process is a “flexible” concept, 
that flexibility only comes into play when a protected interest is in jeopardy.168 
1. Step Zero: Constitutional Presence 
An analysis of the due process that an FTO is entitled to receive from 
the Secretary of State must begin with an inquiry into the organization’s 
protected liberty and property interests. But even before that, because 
FTOs are foreign organizations, a designated group must demonstrate 
sufficient presence in the United States to invoke due process at all. 
Ordinarily, non-resident aliens do not enjoy constitutional rights.169 
However, the Court has extended Fifth Amendment due process protection 
to aliens who “have come within the territory of the United States and 
developed substantial connections with this country.”170 Thus in assessing 
what process must be provided to a designated FTO—including any potential 
access to the classified record on which its designation was based—it is first 
necessary to identify the organization’s connections to the United States. 
 
164 Id. 
165 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976) (citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263-71 (1970)). 
166 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972). 
167 424 U.S. at 333 (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)). 
168 See, e.g., Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 481 (“To say that the concept of due process is flexible 
does not mean that judges are at large to apply it to any and all relationships. Its flexibility 
is in its scope once it has been determined that some process is due; it is a recognition that 
not all situations calling for procedural safeguards call for the same kind of procedure.”). 
169 See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 271 (1990). 
170 Id. 
2017] Blacklisting Foreign Terrorist Organizations 237 
The D.C. Circuit’s decisions addressing FTO designations demonstrate the 
significance of this initial hurdle. People’s Mojahedin I barely ventured an analysis 
of whether People’s Mojahedin was entitled to due process, quickly concluding 
that it and the Tamil Tigers were entirely foreign entities without any connections 
to the United States.171 But in National Council I, the court determined that 
People’s Mojahedin and National Council had established constitutional presence 
in the United States based on National Council’s ownership of a “small bank 
account” and its presence at the National Press Building in Washington, D.C.172 
Rejecting the Government’s argument that these two connections were not 
“substantial,” the court expressly declined to make a general statement about what 
specific types of connections would suffice to trigger due process protection.173 
Instead, the court simply decided—based on the unclassified and classified records 
before it—that National Council had “come within the territory of the United 
States and developed substantial connections with this country.”174 Thus the court 
determined National Council’s contacts—its bank account and Press Building 
presence, and any contacts that might have been apparent in the classified 
record—qualified as “substantial” under Verdugo-Urquidez. 
Despite heavy reliance on a single U.S. bank account in National Council I, the 
D.C. Circuit subsequently addressed a similar scenario and found that the FTO in 
question had not established constitutional presence sufficient to invoke due process 
protection. In 32 County Sovereignty Committee v. Department of State, a group 
challenged its designation as an FTO after the Secretary of State determined the 
group was an alias of the Irish Republican Army.175 Observing that the designated 
organization’s only apparent contacts to the United States were “that some of their 
American ‘members’ personally rented post office boxes and utilized a bank account 
to transmit funds and information,” the court held that the organization failed to 
develop substantial connections with the United States and was therefore not 
entitled to constitutional due process.176 Apparently, the crucial distinction on 
which the court relied was that ownership of the bank account belonged to a member 
of the designated organization, rather than the organization itself—even though 
the member had used that bank account to transfer funds to the group.177 
In sum, two things become apparent from the D.C. Circuit’s “step 
zero” jurisprudence: Relatively minor contacts with the U.S. can suffice 
to garner that organization constitutional due process protection. And 
 
171 182 F.3d 17, 22 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
172 251 F.3d 192, 201-03 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
173 Id. at 202 (citing Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 271). 
174 Id. 
175 292 F.3d 797, 799 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
176 Id. 
177 See id. (“The [record] do[es] not aver that [the] organization possessed any controlling interest 
in property located within the United States, nor do they demonstrate any other form of presence here.”). 
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relatively minor distinctions can make the difference between an FTO 
receiving due process protection or not. 
2. Step One: Interests Implicated by FTO Designations 
If an organization challenging its FTO designation succeeds in 
demonstrating presence such that it is entitled to Fifth Amendment due process 
protection, the legal analysis then proceeds to identification of the organization’s 
implicated liberty or property interests. In seeking to identify these interests, 
National Council I looked to the Supreme Court’s decision in Paul v. Davis.178 That 
case—in which police officers passed out a flyer advertising the name and photo 
of a person who had been arrested for shoplifting—held that an “interest in 
reputation” alone did not implicate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.179 But Paul itself distinguished another Supreme Court decision, 
Wisconsin v. Constantineau.180 In Constantineau, the Court struck down a 
Wisconsin statute that authorized the chief of police to publicly bar sales of liquor 
to someone whose alcohol consumption made one prone to various 
misbehaviors.181 The Constantineau Court reasoned that the posting authorized 
by the statute could be interpreted by the subject of the posting as “a stigma or 
badge of disgrace” that could “expose [the subject] to public embarrassment and 
ridicule,” a reputational injury such that “procedural due process must be met.”182 
In attempting to reconcile the two seemingly incompatible decisions of 
Paul and Constantineau, National Council I observed that the Paul Court had 
focused on “the effects of the [Constantineau] posting beyond stigmatization.”183 
Specifically, the Paul Court reasoned that the Wisconsin law at issue in 
Constantineau had the effect of depriving the subject of the posting of her ability 
to purchase liquor, a right otherwise enjoyed under state law.184 Only because 
the posting in Constantineau “significantly altered [the subject’s] status as a 
matter of state law” was an adequate interest implicated.185 
Just as Paul distinguished Constantineau, National Council I distinguished 
People’s Mojahedin I. In addition to being stigmatized by the FTO designation, 
the court found that National Council was also barred from having U.S. bank 
 
178 251 F.3d at 203 (citing 424 U.S. 693 (1976)). 
179 Paul, 424 U.S. at 695, 711-12 (holding that police officers’ distribution of a flyer to 
“approximately 800 merchants in the Louisville metropolitan area” with the plaintiff ’s name, 
photo, and the label “Active Shoplifter,” did not implicate a liberty or property interest 
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
180 Id. at 701-10 (citing 400 U.S. 433 (1971)). 
181 See 400 U.S. at 434, 437. 
182 Id. at 436. 
183 251 F.3d at 204 (emphasis added). 
184 424 U.S. at 708. 
185 Id. at 708-09. 
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accounts and from receiving “material support” from others—rights which 
they previously enjoyed, and which presumably were more important than 
the right to buy liquor.186 But importantly, National Council I ultimately 
considered the organizations’ property interest in the U.S. bank account alone 
to be an implicated interest under the Due Process Clause.187 
National Council I also discussed—but explicitly declined to pass judgment on—
other potential liberty interests that might be implicated by an FTO designation.188 
The court declined to decide whether either “the right of the members of the 
organizations to enter the United States” or “the provision of material support or 
resources to the organizations”—both asserted as liberty interests—triggered the 
protections of the Due Process Clause.189 In declining to rely upon the latter 
asserted interests by the FTOs, the court acknowledged that “the Secretary argues 
with some convincing force that aliens have no right of entry and that the 
organization has no standing to judicially assert rights which its members could not 
bring to court.”190 And the court characterized as “plausible” the Government’s 
argument that the prohibition on providing material support to designated groups 
“does not affect the ability of anyone to engage in advocacy of the goals of the 
organizations, but only from providing material support which might likely be 
employed in the pursuit of unlawful terrorist purposes as of First Amendment 
protected advocacy.”191 Indeed, the latter view seems to have been vindicated by 
the Supreme Court’s 2010 decision in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, which 
held that the criminal ban on providing material support to FTOs violated 
neither the plaintiffs’ freedom of speech nor their freedom of association.192 
To summarize, National Council I surveyed the potentially implicated 
interests of People’s Mojahedin and National Council, determining that only the 
single, small U.S. bank account was clearly a protected interest under due 
process. It is also clear that stigma alone, without any attendant legal 
ramifications, does not implicate an interest that triggers due process 
protection.193 Something more than stigma is required. Indeed, National Council 
I interpreted Paul to mean “that where the government issues a stigmatizing 
posting (or designation) as a result of which the stigmatized individual is 
‘deprived . . . of a right previously under state law,’ due process is required.”194 
 
186 Nat’l Council I, 251 F.3d at 204. 
187 Id. (“A foreign organization that acquires or holds property in this country may invoke the 
protections of the Constitution when that property is placed in jeopardy by government intervention.”). 
188 Id. at 205. 
189 Id. 
190 Id. at 204. 
191 Id. at 205. 
192 561 U.S. 1, 7-8 (2010). 
193 See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 706 (1976) (“[T]he Court has never held that the mere 
defamation of an individual . . . was sufficient to invoke the guarantees of procedural due process . . . .”). 
194 251 F.3d at 204. 
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In completing the step-one analysis for an FTO, then, it is important to keep 
analytically distinct the preliminary question of constitutional presence from the 
identification of protected liberty or property interests—though the answer to 
the first question undoubtedly informs the answer to the second. It is “clear that 
a foreign organization that acquires or holds property in this country may invoke 
the protections of the Constitution when that property is placed in jeopardy by 
government intervention.”195 But it would seem paradoxical to first determine—at 
the constitutional presence threshold—that a designated FTO has access to 
Fifth Amendment due process protection based on a single, relatively minor 
contact, only to then venture a much broader consideration of potential liberty 
and property interests of the organization entirely divorced from that contact.196 
As noted above, D.C. Circuit jurisprudence indicates that in challenges by 
FTOs, relatively minute differences in the contacts of designated groups with the 
United States can make the difference in whether an organization can invoke due 
process. If organizations can achieve constitutional presence based on slim 
contacts to the United States, only to assert a variety of protected interests entirely 
separate from those contacts on which their constitutional rights are based, 
perverse results are encouraged. Like the Greek soldiers who pierced the defenses 
of Troy in a wooden horse, an FTO would be able to gain the crucial foothold of 
constitutional protection, only to garner significantly more due process protection 
than required to protect its minimal connection. Aside from leading to paradoxical 
results, the outcomes of individual cases would also appear extremely unfair. Why 
should National Council and People’s Mojahedin receive a full suite of 
constitutional due process protection solely because of a single small bank account, 
while 32 County receives none despite its members’ similar U.S. bank account 
used for funneling money to the organization? Such a distinction is unprincipled. 
Moreover, given that Congress’s clear intent in enacting § 1189 was to target 
foreign organizations,197 the Judiciary—to give proper effect to Congress’s 
intent—should be careful not to expand the step-one analysis to include liberty 
and property interests that are not constitutionally required. A contrary 
approach would allow a savvy organization, after being designated by the 
Secretary of State or in advance of such a designation, to establish a handful of 
relatively minor connections to the United States to gain disproportionately 
significant constitutional protections that it otherwise would not enjoy. 
In analyzing the contacts required to achieve constitutional presence for 
a designated terrorist group, it is important to note that the effects of such a 
 
195 Id. (emphasis added). 
196 Cf. Ibrahim v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 669 F.3d 983, 998 (9th Cir. 2012) 
(articulating an implicit requirement of Fifth Amendment due process protection: that the 
protection be related to the challenged action). 
197 See 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(1)(A) (2012); see also supra notes 2–3 and accompanying text. 
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designation—and hence many of the liberty interests impinged by such a 
designation—are essentially the same in every case. For example, such a 
designation will always have the effect of preventing financial and other 
assistance to the group, and of blocking entry into the United States for alien 
members of such organizations.198 Moreover, designation as an FTO will also 
always carry many of the same social effects, including stigmatizing the group 
and dissuading potential members from joining it. Indeed, it is the State 
Department’s express hope that an FTO designation “[s]tigmatizes and 
isolates” the designated group, “[h]eightens public awareness and knowledge 
of terrorist organizations,” and encourages other nations to condemn them.199 
Thus in those cases where the court found that an FTO lacked 
constitutional presence sufficient to trigger due process rights—People’s 
Mojahedin I and 32 County—the court also implicitly determined that the 
interests implicated by the latter consequences, though felt by the respective 
organizations, were insufficient to establish the necessary ties to the United 
States to warrant constitutional due process rights. Thus when an 
organization purchases property, opens a bank account, or otherwise 
establishes a systematic presence in the United States, it should certainly 
receive due process protection for those interests. But it should not, on the basis 
of such contacts, gain entitlement to protection for a variety of other 
interests—like deprivation of material or financial support, or barring of its 
members from entering the United States—that affected the FTO both prior 
to its establishment of constitutional presence and after such establishment. 
3. Step Two: Tailoring the Process Due to the Interests Implicated 
Challenges to FTO designations present a difficult problem. In 
weighing the constraints of due process under the Fifth Amendment 
alongside the criticality of § 1189 to the federal government’s campaign 
against terrorism, how are courts to reconcile the two? 
The Mathews factors provide the answer.200 In assessing the factors at 
this second step, it is important to keep in mind the interests identified 
in the first step. When discerning the constitutionally required process 
for a given action of the Government, the process must be tailored to 
protect only those interests legitimately implicated by the government 
action. It is for this reason that an expansive interpretation of the interests 
 
198 See supra notes 6–9 and accompanying text. 
199 Foreign Terrorist Organizations, supra note 28. 
200 This is particularly true when it comes to the use of classified information in 
judicial review of agency action. Cf., e.g., Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Reno, 
70 F.3d 1045, 1068-71 (9th Cir. 1995) (applying the Mathews test to find the use of 
undisclosed classified information in INS legalization proceedings “violates due process”). 
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implicated by an FTO designation can seriously skew the second-step 
analysis in favor of the FTO beyond what would otherwise be required. 
Given that the FTO designation scheme lies at the heart of the nation’s security 
and counterterrorism strategy,201 it should not be surprising that much of the 
information feeding the Secretary of State’s determinations comes from the U.S. 
intelligence community.202 The Government’s interest in collecting and using such 
intelligence is great—indeed the very purpose of collecting it is to inform the 
decisionmaking of high-level executive branch officials charged with conducting 
the nation’s foreign policy and ensuring national security. 
The inability to access the classified record relied upon by the Secretary of 
State undoubtedly hampers the designated organization’s ability to mount an 
effective legal challenge, especially when a crucial basis for the designation is 
contained only in the classified record.203 People’s Mojahedin III itself illustrates the 
practical difficulties of such a challenge. Because counsel for People’s Mojahedin 
did not have access to the classified record, they were forced to argue the 
Secretary’s classified material probably didn’t contain substantial support for the 
designation, largely by pointing to a similar proceeding in the United Kingdom 
which had concluded that the organization no longer posed a terror risk.204 
The risk of erroneous deprivation is also certainly greater when those being 
subjected to government action are unable to access the full record on which the 
Government’s decision is based. For example, in its third round of litigation, 
People’s Mojahedin worried that some of that classified information could contain 
“outlandish allegations disseminated by the Iranian intelligence services, whose 
task is to ensure that [People’s Mojahedin]’s FTO designation is maintained.”205 
As noted earlier, Professor Donohue has described the designation process for 
terrorist groups as lying at the intersection of several areas of law, including foreign 
relations and national security.206 Given that observation, it would seem that an 
FTO designation decision by the Secretary of State—even if not a decision which 
falls entirely within the Executive’s prerogative to conduct the nation’s foreign 
affairs—is at least heavily infused with the character of a foreign policy 
decision. Indeed, the State Department’s decision to designate an organization 
 
201 See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
202 See also Nat’l Council I, 251 F.3d 192, 197 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (noting that in the court’s experience the 
Secretary’s administrative record in FTO designation challenges usually contains classified information). 
203 See Rafeedie v. INS, 880 F.2d 506, 516 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (acknowledging the difficulties 
posed for a petitioner who—“like Joseph K. in The Trial—can prevail . . . only if he can rebut 
the undisclosed evidence against him, i.e., prove that he is not a terrorist regardless of what 
might be implied by the Government’s confidential information. It is difficult to imagine how 
even someone innocent of all wrongdoing could meet such a burden.”). 
204 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 135, at 49-51. 
205 Reply Brief for Petitioner, supra note 135, at 23. 
206 See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
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as an FTO is in large part directed at foreign governments, because fighting 
terrorism requires a coordinated response from the international community.207 
Although the Judiciary’s role in addressing constitutional questions is of 
course incontestable, courts should be careful to interpret the constitutional 
requirements of due process for FTOs with a presence in the United 
States with proper consideration given to the Executive’s constitutional 
role in conducting foreign relations and fighting terrorism.208 
The Government has at least one interest that cuts against withholding 
classified information in FTO designation challenges: promoting “fairness in the 
adjudications of United States courts.”209 But aside from that amorphous and 
hard-to-measure interest, the Government has several compelling interests in 
safeguarding national security, protecting classified information, and fighting 
terrorism in an efficient, cost-effective manner. Judge Friendly once observed 
that courts began requiring hearings more frequently after the Supreme Court’s 
landmark decision in Goldberg v. Kelly.210 Acknowledging the “vast increase in the 
number and types of hearings required in all areas in which the government and 
the individual interact,” Judge Friendly reasoned that “common sense dictates” 
that in many cases involving agency adjudicative decisions the Government could 
satisfy its burden with “less than full trial-type hearings.”211 In particular, cost is 
a legitimate concern because each new procedural protection afforded will cost 
the government money and presumably carry additional risks.212 Although the 
precise application of the balancing test will always be “uncertain and subjective,” 
it is clear that the “required degree of procedural safeguards varies . . . inversely 
with the burden and any other adverse consequences of affording it.”213 
 
207 See Foreign Terrorist Organizations, supra note 28 (noting two of the purposes of an 
FTO designation: to “encourage other nations” to block terrorism financing; and to send 
“[s]ignals to other governments [of] our concern about named organizations”). 
208 See generally Chi. & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 114 
(1948) (stating that decisions which “embody Presidential discretion as to political matters 
[are] beyond the competence of the courts to adjudicate”). 
209 Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043, 1060-61 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (noting “grave concern[s over] 
. . . heavy reliance upon in camera ex parte evidence”); see also Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. 
McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 170-71 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“[D]emocracy implies respect for 
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210 See Henry J. Friendly, “Some Kind of Hearing”, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1267-68 
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211 Id. at 1268. 
212 See id. at 1276 (“[P]rocedural requirements entail the expenditure of limited resources, 
. . . at some point the benefit to individuals from an additional safeguard is substantially 
outweighed by the cost of providing such protection, and . . . the expense of protecting those 
likely to be found undeserving will probably come out of the pockets of the deserving.”). 
213 Id. at 1278 (footnote omitted). 
244 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 166: 213 
A criminal proceeding, of course, is different—and the Government rightly 
faces a much higher threshold when seeking to conceal classified information 
that is being used to convict.214 Yet although some have argued that the damage 
inflicted on a designated FTO is comparable to that of a convicted criminal,215 
that argument is misguided. While the ramifications of an FTO designation 
are no doubt serious, it would be facetious to suggest that hindering a group’s 
ability to fundraise and carry out its operations is a punishment on par with 
incarceration and the attendant consequences that flow from a criminal 
conviction. Indeed, the separate federal criminal ban on providing material 
support to FTOs does entail criminal prosecutions with the latter consequences 
and attendant safeguards, but those proceedings are entirely separate and 
distinct from the designation of an FTO. And the Supreme Court already held 
that criminal ban passed constitutional muster in Humanitarian Law Project.216 
Balancing the organization’s interest in the bank account and the 
Government’s interest in national security, National Council I was careful to 
distinguish the what from the when of due process analysis.217 The court relied 
on United States v. Yunis for the proposition that “the United States enjoys a 
privilege in classified information affecting national security so strong that 
even a criminal defendant to whose defense such information is relevant 
cannot pierce that privilege absent a specific showing of materiality.”218 The 
court reasoned such an interest in classified national security information 
informs the what rather than the when of due process analysis.219 
The court determined the when of due process requires the Secretary of 
State to afford organizations notice and an opportunity to rebut the Secretary’s 
record prior to her making the FTO designation, reasoning that pre-deprivation 
process “would [not] interfere with the Secretary’s duty to carry out foreign 
policy.”220 But the court nonetheless held that the what of due process only 
required that the Secretary grant access to the unclassified portions of the 
record.221 Relying heavily on the flexible due process standard set forth in 
 
214 See Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 60-61 (1957) (“Where the disclosure of 
[classified information] . . . is relevant and helpful to the defense of an accused, or is 
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Mathews, the court required the Secretary provide the organizations “the 
opportunity to present, at least in written form, such evidence as those entities 
may be able to produce to rebut the administrative record.”222 No such 
requirement applied to the classified record. Regarding the Secretary’s reliance 
on classified information, the court stated simply that she “need not disclose the 
classified information to be presented in camera and ex parte,” because such 
information “is within the privilege and prerogative of the executive.”223 
However, in Abourezk v. Reagan the D.C. Circuit identified a “firmly held main 
rule that a court may not dispose of the merits of a case on the basis of ex parte, in 
camera submissions.”224 The Abourezk court stated that “[o]nly in the most 
extraordinary circumstances does our precedent countenance court reliance upon 
ex parte evidence to decide the merits of a dispute,” pointing to Molerio v. Federal 
Bureau of Investigation as an example of such an “extraordinary” case.225 Because in 
Molerio the Government demonstrated “acute national security concerns” and 
the plaintiff “had been accorded considerable discovery of non-[classified] 
materials,” the use of ex parte, in camera evidence was permissible.226 This holding 
was despite the fact that the use of such classified information posed a “large risk 
that an unjust result would eventuate if the case proceeded without the privileged 
material”227—in other words, a great risk of erroneous deprivation. 
Importantly, the other explicit exceptions to Abourezk’s “main rule” were those 
“specified by statute,” although in such cases the courts still must “confine to a 
narrow path submissions not in accord with our general mode of open 
proceedings.”228 Section 1189 is such a statutory scheme—and therefore should not 
be subject to the general rule prohibiting disposition of the merits of a case on in 
camera, ex parte classified evidence. Generally the parties to a proceeding must be 
accorded full access to the information being used against them as a requirement of 
due process.229 But as Abourezk noted, this is not always the case—particularly when 
compelling national security interests are at stake, and when Congress has expressly 
addressed the precise question as part of a comprehensive statutory scheme 
designed to facilitate the Secretary of State’s conduct of the nation’s foreign affairs. 
In Jifry v. FAA, the D.C. Circuit reviewed the claims of “two non-resident 
alien pilots” who alleged that the Federal Aviation Administration violated the 
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Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause by revoking their airman certificates.230 
The pilots argued that “they were denied meaningful notice of the evidence 
against them and a meaningful opportunity to be heard” because they were 
denied access to the classified information on which the revocations were 
based.231 The court rejected that argument, relying explicitly on the line of cases 
dealing with People’s Mojahedin.232 In weighing the interests at stake, the Jifry 
court stated that the pilots’ interest “in possessing FAA airman certificates to fly 
foreign aircraft outside of the United States . . . pales in significance to the 
government’s security interests in preventing pilots from using civil aircraft as 
instruments of terror.”233 The plaintiffs’ attempt to prevent the Government 
from relying on classified information ex parte and in camera, the court stated, 
was “not well-taken.”234 Indeed, the Government in People’s Mojahedin III pointed 
to Jifry to support its argument that agency “decision[s] based on classified 
information not disclosed to the relevant parties or their attorneys” do not violate 
due process, and “that it is perfectly proper for the [c]ourt to take this classified 
information into account ex parte/in camera as it reviews the agency action.”235 
People’s Mojahedin responded by distinguishing its situation from the facts 
of Jifry. The group argued that the § 1189 designation scheme “impinges on the 
fundamental rights” of the organization and its “U.S. supporters.”236 But again, 
this argument is misguided. An FTO has no constitutional due process 
rights—fundamental or otherwise—until it establishes substantial connections 
with the United States.237 Once it establishes such connections to the United 
States—by purchasing property, opening a bank account, or establishing a 
continual place of business—it must be accorded constitutional due process 
protections to safeguard those interests.238 But it is hard to see how, by 
establishing a single small bank account or other comparable contact with the 
United States, National Council had somehow earned for itself “fundamental 
rights” unrelated to that bank account that must be accorded constitutional 
protection. Given the low threshold set by the D.C. Circuit for what qualifies 
as “substantial,” a contrary approach would prove absurd.239 And because the 
effects of the designation would have been felt equally by National Council whether 
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or not it possessed a small U.S. bank account, it seems far-fetched to suggest that 
contact should drastically alter the bank’s level of constitutional protection. 
Indeed, even sensitive—but less-than-classified—information may sometimes 
be constitutionally withheld from an organization challenging its terrorist 
designation based on the public and private interests involved. In Al-Aqeel v. 
Paulson, a Saudi Arabian citizen challenged his terrorist designation by the 
Secretary of the Treasury under IEEPA.240 The court first determined the 
petitioner had established a constitutional presence in the United States such that 
he could invoke due process.241 The petitioner sought access to the sensitive but 
unclassified information in the record, arguing “that because IEEPA provides for 
ex parte and in camera judicial review of classified portions of the record in a 
challenge to a designation under the Act, he [was] therefore entitled to the non-
classified portions of the record, including privileged and [sensitive but 
unclassified] materials.”242 The court rejected that request, explaining that a 
petitioner’s access to privileged but unclassified materials is “determined by 
a ten-factor balancing test” set forth in Frankenhauser v. Rizzo.243 Based on 
that test, the court held that the petitioner did not provide a “legal basis for 
obtaining the privileged portions of the Administrative Record.”244 
Thus Al-Aqeel illustrates that even information less sensitive than classified 
information may be constitutionally withheld from a party seeking revocation 
of a government-imposed terrorist designation. So it would be incredible to suggest 
that more sensitive information—that which has been formally classified—should 
be released merely because that information is necessary to sustain the 
Secretary’s designation determination under the FTO designation scheme. 
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The Supreme Court has recognized that executive branch officials have a 
great deal of discretion in deciding who may access classified national security 
information. In Department of Navy v. Egan, the Supreme Court reviewed the 
discharge of a naval facility employee due to revocation of his security 
clearance and held that a review board lacked statutory authority to review 
the underlying clearance revocation.245 Though the decision was made on 
statutory grounds, the Court emphasized the great deference the Judiciary 
ordinarily gives the Executive in determining who may have access to 
classified information and thus considered the decision unreviewable.246 
As discussed earlier, when due process requires a hearing, that hearing must 
be meaningful. In its third challenge, People’s Mojahedin argued the required 
chance to rebut the Secretary’s record could only be meaningful if it included “the 
opportunity to present . . . such evidence as those entities may be able to produce 
to rebut the administrative record or otherwise negate the proposition that they 
are” terrorist organizations.247 The Government, however, believed that the court 
was more than capable of reviewing the information for itself.248 Weighing the 
interests, some commentators have argued that due process could be satisfied by 
something less than full disclosure of the classified record,249 or by alternate 
procedures in which another party could review the classified information.250 
Indeed, People’s Mojahedin in its third appearance before the D.C. Circuit 
argued that even granting the Government’s compelling interest in protecting 
classified information, “the importance of the individual rights affected by an 
FTO designation requires narrow tailoring of any significant constraint on the 
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ability to mount an effective challenge.”251 They argued that “[a] blanket 
prohibition on even limited access to classified information on which a designation 
rests does not satisfy that requirement.”252 People’s Mojahedin asserted, for 
example, that giving access to its counsel or to some third party is necessary to 
ensure that only restrictions absolutely necessary to protect the Government’s 
national security interest are permitted.253 They also suggested requiring the 
Secretary to provide an unclassified summary of the information relied on, and 
reviewing the classified record and “tailoring its redactions more narrowly” to 
ensure that only information that should be classified is actually classified.254 
Of course, requiring the Secretary to grant FTOs access to classified 
information—regardless of the form—would flatly contradict Congress’s directive 
in the text of § 1189.255 Validation of the review Congress intended—limited to the 
unclassified record—is not, as People’s Mojahedin asserted, an “abdication of any 
duty to engage in meaningful judicial review,”256 but rather a faithful adherence to 
the considered view of Congress and a sensible tailoring of the constitutionally 
required procedures to the constitutionally implicated interests. And even People’s 
Mojahedin apparently recognized the compelling nature of the Government’s 
interest in protecting classified information by conceding that, upon judicial review 
of the Secretary’s designation, only if the court is inclined to uphold the designation 
based on the classified record would “additional disclosures” be needed.257 
Certainly Congress judged that the Secretary was both capable and 
well-positioned to evaluate the quality of the intelligence and the 
national security and foreign policy concerns on which the designation 
was based—especially with the support of the U.S. intelligence professionals 
furnishing the classified information. Although some have argued that the use 
of ex parte, in camera submissions of classified material renders the ability to 
present evidence in defense meaningless,258 that argument cannot be taken 
seriously. Indeed, People’s Mojahedin itself had a number of high-profile 
American officials lobbying the Secretary of State to remove its FTO 
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designation.259 Certainly the Secretary of State—the official responsible for 
operationalizing the President’s chartered course for foreign affairs—can be 
expected to respond to legitimate countervailing information, national security, 
and foreign policy concerns that would warrant revocation of a designation. 
Moreover, although § 1189 generally tracks the language of the APA, Congress 
replaced the APA’s “substantial evidence” standard—requiring that agency 
decisions and actions be supported by substantial evidence in the administrative 
record—with § 1189’s “substantial support” language.260 The D.C. Circuit has 
observed that the change in language may reflect Congress’ recognition that 
“substantial evidence” is “a term of art in administrative law” that typically requires 
adversarial, adjudicative procedures by the agency involved, and that therefore 
Congress indicated that such procedures were not intended for the FTO scheme.261 
Given that § 1189 erects a comprehensive scheme for targeting foreign 
organizations, whose constitutional presence in the United States is often based 
on minute contacts to begin with, the Judiciary ought to accord Congress’ 
determination great respect and recognize that the interests of designated 
FTOs should not override those of the President and Secretary of State in 
providing for the nation’s security. The interests of designated FTOs, under a 
traditional due process analysis considering the range of public and private 
interests involved, are more than adequately protected by the procedures for 
handling classified information provided by § 1189. 
C. Comparative Analysis 
Although analysis along traditional due process lines is essential to 
understanding if § 1189 passes constitutional muster, equally illuminating is a 
practical comparison of § 1189 to a post–World War II statutory scheme for 
blacklisting organizations. At the onset of the Cold War, a fear of subversive 
and Communist infiltration in government agencies led to an Executive Order 
creating a designation scheme under which the Attorney General targeted 
groups suspected of subversive activities against the U.S. government. The 
scheme—which, like the modern FTO designation system, entailed the 
Government identifying and labeling private organizations believed to pose a 
threat to national security—was ultimately reviewed by the Supreme Court. 
 
259 See Daniel Benjamin, Giuliani Took Money From a Group That Killed Americans. Does Trump Care?, 
POLITICO (Nov. 23, 2016), http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/11/giuliani-mek-terrorist-group-
money-bolton-iran-214479 [https://perma.cc/58GM-KB8Q] (detailing lobbying efforts by high-profile 
U.S. political figures, including former New York City Mayor Rudy Giuliani and former U.N. Ambassador 
John Bolton, on behalf of People’s Mojahedin in its effort to be removed from the FTO list). 
260 Compare 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (2012), with § 1189(c)(3)(D). 
261 People’s Mojahedin I, 182 F.3d 17, 24 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
2017] Blacklisting Foreign Terrorist Organizations 251 
Although not dealing directly with classified material, the resultant analysis 
provides a useful point of comparison between the two schemes. 
Similarly, more recent litigation over the Government’s detainment of 
terrorism suspects has produced a body of law addressing the use of 
classified information in detainees’ legal challenges to their confinement. 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Boumediene v. Bush, holding that 
detainees had the right to challenge their detentions in court, and the 
subsequent litigation in lower courts thus provides another point of 
reference for considering the role of classified information in the FTO 
context—especially given the shared terrorism nexus with § 1189. 
1. The Attorney General’s Designation of Subversive Organizations 
The FTO designation scheme is not the first time our nation has 
blacklisted organizations perceived as a threat to national security. In the 
decades after World War II, a similar program was devised for groups aligned 
with communist, fascist, and totalitarian movements. The Supreme Court 
famously reviewed the constitutionality of this program in Joint Anti-Fascist 
Refugee Committee v. McGrath.262 
Executive Order 9835 initiated the so-called “Employees Loyalty Program” for 
federal executive branch employees and established a “Loyalty Review Board.”263 
The Attorney General was directed to create a list of organizations that he deemed 
“totalitarian, fascist, communist or subversive.”264 The program was intended to 
identify and root out disloyal persons working for the federal government.265 It 
provided that the Attorney General’s list of organizations would be used in 
proceedings before the Loyalty Review Board when evaluating the loyalty of 
individual federal employees.266 Membership in a designated organization 
“serve[d] as evidence . . . [against] persons reasonably suspected of disloyalty.”267 
As under § 1189, employees in proceedings before the Loyalty Review Board 
did not have the ability to challenge the underlying designation of the organization 
with which they were affiliated.268 Additionally, “[p]otential members, contributors 
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or beneficiaries of listed organizations may well be influenced by use of the 
designation, for instance, as ground for rejection of applications for commissions in 
the armed forces or for permits for meetings in the auditoriums of public housing 
projects.”269 Designations under the scheme were “made without notice, without 
disclosure of any reasons justifying it, without opportunity to meet the undisclosed 
evidence or suspicion on which designation may have been based, and without 
opportunity to establish affirmatively that the aims and acts of the organization 
[were] innocent.”270 Designation by the Attorney General, like designation as an 
FTO by the Secretary of State, came with significant repercussions. Such 
designations “cripple[d] the functioning and damage[d] the reputation of those 
organizations in their respective communities and in the nation.”271 
In Joint Anti-Fascist, the Supreme Court consolidated three cases questioning 
“whether . . . the Attorney General of the United States ha[d] authority to 
include the complaining organization in a list of organizations designated by 
him” pursuant to Executive Order 9835.272 Collectively, the designated groups 
complained that their designations by the Attorney General discouraged people 
from making financial contributions and participating in organizational 
activities, required cancellation of meetings and lectures, revoked federal tax 
exemptions, resulted in members being publicly ridiculed, and, in one case, 
caused to be “instituted against the [organization] and its members a multiplicity 
of administrative proceedings, including those to rescind licenses, franchises, 
. . . or to impede the naturalization of its members.”273 
The case produced six opinions, none backed by a majority of the Court. 
The final judgment, rendered by Justice Burton, remanded the case with a 
denial of the Government’s motion to dismiss.274 That opinion, joined by 
Justice Douglas, entirely avoided the constitutional due process question.275 
Because the Court was considering a motion to dismiss, Justice Burton 
reasoned that if the allegations in the complaint were taken as facts, then 
the designations made by the Attorney General were not even authorized 
by the Executive Order.276 The designations had been “patently arbitrary,” 
he wrote, because they were completely unsupported if relying only on “the 
very facts alleged by [the organizations] in their own complaints.”277 
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Concurring separately, Justice Black disagreed that the case could be disposed 
of so easily—and passionately took issue with the designations, which he derided 
as “deadly edicts.”278 In his view, the designations were “the practical equivalents 
of confiscation and death sentences for any blacklisted organization.”279 The 
President and Attorney General had no authority whatsoever to “determine, list 
and publicize individuals and groups as traitors and public enemies,” Justice Black 
wrote.280 Justice Black resolutely concluded that “with or without a hearing,” the 
lists were unconstitutional—and even if they were constitutional, the Fifth 
Amendment would require notice and a hearing beforehand.281 
Justice Frankfurter also felt compelled to address the constitutional 
challenges to the Attorney General’s designations. Because of the “infinite 
variety and perplexity of the tasks of government,” he recognized that a 
specific set of due process protections may be fair in some situations and unfair 
in others.282 In a prescient opinion issued more than twenty years before 
Mathews, Justice Frankfurter acknowledged that the particular procedures 
required by the Constitution must depend on the interests at stake.283 
Analyzing the interests at stake in the Attorney General’s designations, Justice 
Frankfurter characterized national security as “the greatest of all public interests” 
and considered that the designations at issue did not “directly deprive anyone of 
liberty of property.”284 He also considered it important that the designations were 
made by the Attorney General—the nation’s top law enforcement officer—and that 
the scheme had been developed by other duly elected officials sworn to uphold the 
Constitution.285 On the other hand, he noted the fact that the Bill of Rights is 
predominantly concerned with procedural protections,286 and that hearings have 
featured prominently in the Court’s earlier considerations of due process.287 Only 
rarely, he noted, had the Court dispensed with a hearing requirement.288 
Justice Frankfurter concluded that due process required notice and a 
hearing.289 He reasoned that “fairness can rarely be obtained by secret, 
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one-sided determination of facts decisive of rights” and that there was no 
reason to believe that it would be “impractical or prejudicial to a concrete 
public interest to disclose to organizations the nature of the case against 
them and to permit them to meet it if they can.”290 
Justice Douglas joined these Justices in rejecting the Government’s motion to 
dismiss. He also acknowledged the serious consequences of the Attorney 
General’s designations—both those that flow indirectly from “public opinion,” 
and those that result from regulatory agencies taking action to “penalize or police” 
designated organizations following their designations.291 He was also concerned 
about the lack of a hearing prior to the designation being made. Reasoning that 
notice and a hearing are required “[i]n situations far less severe or important than 
these,” including relatively minor civil proceedings of all sorts, he argued that the 
same should be required before “determinations that may well destroy” the 
designated organization.292 Although he acceded that the Government’s interest 
in national security was great, Justice Douglas believed that concern was relevant 
“only to those sensitive areas where secrets are or may be available, where critical 
policies are being formulated, or where sabotage can be committed.”293 
In the last concurring opinion of the case, Justice Jackson agreed a hearing 
was required at some point in the designation procedure.294 Justice Jackson 
believed the designation by itself “deprive[d] the organizations themselves of 
no legal right or immunity,” because their failure to increase membership or 
receive financial contributions were “applied by public disapproval, not by 
law.”295 Indeed, he reasoned that “[i]f the only effect of the Loyalty Order was 
that suffered by the organizations, I should think their right to relief very 
dubious.”296 Justice Jackson was primarily concerned about the employees 
discharged and barred from future government employment on the basis of 
the designation—not the organization itself.297 Although concurring with the 
judgement in the case, Justice Jackson—like Justice Frankfurter—felt that 
only the individual employees were entitled to a hearing.298 
In language paralleling that used by critics of the FTO designation scheme, 
Justice Douglas illustrated his qualms with the Attorney General’s list by way of 
example—the case of Dorothy Bailey, who was hauled before the Loyalty Review 
Board over suspicions that she was affiliated with a Communist front 
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organization.299 He recounted that the case against Ms. Bailey was based largely 
on FBI reports, but when her lawyer questioned the board chairman, the chairman 
was unable to provide any specific information about her accusers’ identities or 
affiliations.300 Because she could not obtain any information about the witnesses 
against her, Justice Douglas worried, she had “no way of defending” herself against 
the charges.301 Such a procedure, he said, “is abhorrent to fundamental justice.”302 
Justices Reed, Minton, and Chief Justice Vinson dissented. Although tolerant 
of efforts to change social life by methods of persuasion and advocacy, the three 
Justices emphasized the nation’s “right and duty to protect its existence against any 
force that seeks its overthrow or changes in its structure by other than constitutional 
means.”303 They feared a “weakness of will” from a government “indifferent to 
manifestations of subversion,” and argued that genuine concern about potential 
actions from such organizations required the Government to take action.304 
Justice Reed acknowledged that the designation scheme did not require 
proof in the usual sense, but only an “examination and determination by the 
Attorney General”—and also said that none was needed because the 
proceedings were not criminal prosecutions.305 Addressing the organizations’ 
due process argument, he reasoned that although the designations by the 
Attorney General damage the organizations’ “prestige, reputation and earning 
power,” they did not “prohibit any business of the organizations, subject them 
to any punishment[,] or deprive them of liberty of speech or other freedom.”306 
As a result, there was simply “no deprivation of any property or liberty of any 
listed organization by the Attorney General’s designation.”307 
Justice Reed also found it important that the organizations’ designations did 
not have “any finality in determining the loyalty of members” in proceedings 
before the Loyalty Review Board.308 Although employees could not directly 
contest the underlying designation of an organization, they “do[] have every 
opportunity to explain [their] association with that organization.”309 Such an 
opportunity, he concluded, was sufficient for constitutional purposes.310 Due 
process depends on the particular government action in question, Justice Reed 
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reasoned.311 And as such, the “Government should be free to proceed without 
notice or hearing” in designating potentially dangerous organizations because 
the employees’ rights are thereafter protected by separate proceedings.312 Justice 
Reed also pointed to practical reasons for having one executive official make the 
designation, deeming it preferable to have the Attorney General conduct one 
investigation and make one determination as opposed to separate investigations 
“by each of the more than a hundred agencies of government that are catalogued 
in the United States Government Organization Manual.”313 
Evaluating the Joint Anti-Fascist opinions thus reveals the Justices agreed 
that a stigma imposed upon a group by a designation, by itself, did not 
implicate the protections afforded by the Due Process Clause.314 This 
consensus is consistent with this Comment’s analysis of National Council I 
and 32 County Sovereignty Committee.315  
But more generally, America’s experience with the fear of communist 
subversion in the federal government offers several insights for assessing the 
constitutionality of § 1189. As Justice Douglas conceded with respect to Ms. Bailey, 
she was not charged with a crime, and so she did not have a right to confront the 
witnesses against her under the Sixth Amendment.316 And importantly, while 
neither employees accused of disloyalty after World War II nor persons charged 
with materially supporting terrorist groups may challenge the underlying 
designations of the organizations with which they allegedly affiliated, the latter 
proceeding is criminal—persons charged with providing material support to an 
FTO face a criminal trial, with the full range of constitutional protections afforded 
and the corresponding threat of penal punishments. 
Moreover, the Joint Anti-Fascist opinions were primarily concerned with 
the need to provide notice and the opportunity to rebut the Attorney 
General’s decision—a process that, as discussed earlier, the D.C. Circuit has 
already required in the FTO context.317 The concurring Justices agreed that 
a hearing was needed, but did not elaborate on the precise form of that 
 
311 Id. at 212-13. 
312 Id. (“Petitioners will have [post-designation] protection when steps are taken to 
punish or enjoin their activities. Where notice and such administrative hearing as the Code 
[sic] Federal Regulations prescribes precede punishment, injunction or discharge, 
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participated in [Joint Anti-Fascist] viewed any ‘stigma’ imposed by official action of the Attorney 
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315 See supra subsection III.B.2. 
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hearing, nor did they require that the Government divulge any sensitive 
information in providing such a hearing. 
Also significant is the fact that those organizations listed by the Attorney 
General were domestic organizations. Indeed, with respect to the 
constitutionality of the underlying designation, the crucial analytical difference 
between the two schemes is that the FTO scheme targets exclusively foreign 
organizations, whereas the groups listed by the Attorney General following World 
War II were domestic organizations.318 It is undoubtedly true that, as articulated 
by one lower court judge in the proceedings leading up to Joint Anti-Fascist, that 
however imprecise the word “subversive” is, “[i]t is highly defamatory” and causes 
the organization to “lose reputation, members, supporters, contributions from 
government employees and others, valuable privileges, speakers, and meeting 
places.” 319 As explained in Section III.B., however, such domestic organizations 
may rightfully assert a number of legitimate property and liberty interests that 
a foreign organization with minimal contacts to the United States cannot. 
Domestic organizations have pre-existing constitutional and statutory rights 
to solicit financial and human support, to hold meetings, to express and 
publicize their political views, and to possess property in the United States. 
Foreign organizations do not enjoy similar rights—certainly not under the 
Constitution. Foreign organizations’ lack of due process rights means that the 
Government may deprive those organizations of their liberty and property 
interests without being required to provide due process. 
Comparing the Government’s response to the fight against terrorism to its 
actions against communism during the McCarthy era, Professor Cole argued that 
America is repeating many of the mistakes of its past.320 But as discussed at length, 
there are a number of considerable differences between America’s past and the 
contemporary experiences designating foreign groups as terrorist organizations. 
Moreover, the fact that the FTO designation scheme was enacted by congressional 
act, and not an Executive Order, should warrant even greater deference than was 
accorded to the Attorney General’s designations under the Cold War–era scheme. 
As Justice Frankfurter acknowledged in his concurring opinion, an act of 
Congress should receive more deference from the Judiciary than would a 
designation scheme established by the President in an Executive Order.321 
 
318 Indeed, the People’s Mojahedin I court recognized this distinction when it observed that 
the two schemes unquestionably “bear some resemblance,” but noted the major difference was that 
the organizations challenging their designations in Joint Anti-Fascist were domestic groups, whereas 
§ 1189 is specifically directed to foreign organizations. 182 F.3d 17, 22 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
319 Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. Clark, 177 F.2d 79, 85 (D.C. Cir. 1949) 
(Edgerton, J., dissenting), rev’d, 341 U.S. 123. 
320 See Cole supra note 41, at 28-30. 
321 Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm., 341 U.S. at 173 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
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2. Post-9/11 Habeas Cases 
Before the D.C. Circuit rendered People’s Mojahedin III, the organizations and 
the Government argued about the relevance of the habeas corpus cases stemming 
from post-9/11 terror suspect detention. In Boumediene v. Bush, the Supreme Court 
held the Suspension Clause of the Constitution applied at the U.S. military post at 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and that aliens detained there could challenge their 
detentions through habeas proceedings.322 However, the Court expressly 
disavowed any attempt to resolve issues related to what degree of access to classified 
information detainees may have in those proceedings.323 Instead, the Court left 
those issues to be worked out by the district courts, acknowledging that “the 
Government has a legitimate interest in protecting sources and methods of 
intelligence gathering” and “expect[ing] that the District Court will use its 
discretion to accommodate this interest to the greatest extent possible.”324 
On remand, the district courts set forth the parameters for access to 
classified information. In one case, Judge Kessler ordered that “[i]f any 
information to be disclosed to Petitioner . . . is classified, the Government shall 
provide Petitioner with an adequate substitute and, unless granted an exception, 
provide Petitioner’s counsel with the classified information, provided 
Petitioner’s counsel is cleared to access such information.”325 However, 
recognizing the Government’s compelling interest in safeguarding information 
pertinent to national security, the district court further stipulated that the 
Government could make a motion to prevent disclosure, citing national security.326 
In another case, Al Odah v. United States, the D.C. Circuit reviewed a district 
court order “compelling disclosure of certain classified information to counsel 
for certain detainees held at Guantanamo Bay.”327 The court remanded the case 
to the district court, specifying the findings that must be made before such an 
order could be issued.328 The court directed “the habeas court [to] proceed by 
determining whether the classified information is material and counsel’s access 
to it is necessary to facilitate meaningful review, and whether no alternatives to 
access would suffice to provide the detainee with the meaningful opportunity 
required by Boumediene.”329 Even in a criminal proceeding, discovery of 
classified information requires more than a “mere showing of theoretical 
relevance” to the defendant’s case.330 Accordingly, in the habeas context, 
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“before the district court may compel the disclosure of classified information, 
it must determine that the information is both relevant and material—in the 
sense that it is at least helpful to the petitioner’s habeas case.”331 
Likewise, in Bismullah v. Gates—in which Guantanamo detainees 
challenged their designation as enemy combatants by a military tribunal—the 
D.C. Circuit explained that detainees’ access to classified information 
depended on how necessary such access was to allow for meaningful review of 
the record before the court.332 The court issued a protective order granting a 
“presumption . . . that counsel for a detainee has a ‘need to know’ the classified 
information relating to his client’s case.”333 However, the court also left room 
for the Government to withhold “certain highly sensitive information” from 
the detainee, although required it still be shown to the court.334 
Relatedly, People’s Mojahedin argued a hearing could not be meaningful 
without access to the classified information being used against it. Pointing to 
Bismullah, People’s Mojahedin argued that ex parte, in camera submission of 
the classified record to the court could not allow for the “informed participation 
by counsel” necessary to help the court conduct its review of the record.335 
People’s Mojahedin lauded the Bismullah court’s development of a 
middle-ground approach “aimed at maximizing counsel’s access to the 
information while at the same time guarding against inappropriate dissemination 
of classified material.”336 Because of “the importance of the rights at stake,” it 
asserted, some access to the classified record used by the Secretary of State was 
necessary to facilitate meaningful review.337 But the Government countered 
that the analogy to the 9/11 habeas cases was misguided: those detentions posed 
the threat of “indefinite incarceration of individuals protected by constitutional 
habeas rights” and thus involved “a legal and factual scenario obviously 
different” from the FTO designation scheme.338 
The Government’s position seems to be the stronger one. Dealing with 
detainment for a lengthy and perhaps indeterminate amount of time 
constitutes a far more onerous burden than deprivation of a group’s ability 
to fundraise, solicit membership, and receive support from members of the 
public. Moreover, even in the habeas context, the Boumediene Court 
recognized the Government’s interest in national security and left the 
lower courts free to withhold classified information on a case-by-case basis. 
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Indeed, the habeas cases illustrate that what constitutes “meaningful” 
notice and opportunity to be heard may differ depending upon a number 
of factors, including relevance to the petitioner’s case and the importance 
of the national security interests involved. The main difference between 
the habeas cases and challenges to FTO designations is that the private 
interests at stake are significantly greater in the former, such that even 
an equivalent interest in national security by the Government should 
prevail in the FTO context where it would not in the habeas context. 
Finally, habeas proceedings evaluate the detentions of foreign individuals held 
by United States officials, either on U.S. territory or on a U.S. military installation 
like Guantanamo. As Boumediene properly recognized, the constitutional 
protections afforded for these people are very different—and decidedly 
stronger—in the habeas context than for organizations in the FTO context. 
CONCLUSION 
The demands of due process must be respected at all times—even, as Justice 
Frankfurter observed in Joint Anti-Fascist, during “times of agitation and anxiety, 
when fear and suspicion impregnate the air we breathe.”339 In the twenty years 
since the enactment of AEDPA and the creation of the FTO list, no small number 
of organizations have been devastated by their designation by the Secretary of 
State. According to the State Department, sixty-one organizations are currently 
designated as FTOs, and only twelve have ever had their designations removed.340 
An FTO designation is no doubt a powerful weapon: affected organizations have 
been stripped of much financial, material, and moral support. And it is also true 
that the Executive Branch has strong interests in restricting and controlling access 
to classified information—and it must be free to collect, use, and rely upon that 
information in providing for the nation’s security. This is especially true when 
officers’ actions are directed at foreign entities that U.S. intelligence services have 
determined pose a legitimate threat to the United States. Respect for this concern 
is embodied in the Supreme Court’s due process jurisprudence, which allows for 
procedures tailored to accommodate the public interest.341 And protecting the 
nation’s classified information is among the most compelling public interests.342 
But the D.C. Circuit’s line of cases confronting § 1189 and its allowance of 
the use of classified information by the Secretary of State have failed to 
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definitively settle whether essential reliance on classified information can satisfy 
due process under the Fifth Amendment. But despite the court’s wavering path, 
analyzing the court’s jurisprudence and due process principles, and comparing 
the designation scheme to McCarthy-era designations and modern habeas 
corpus cases, reveals that § 1189’s use of classified information in making FTO 
designations comports with due process. 
Due process is a “majestic concept” that, although informed by historic 
experience, “is also a living principle” that must accommodate new challenges.343 
Just as modern-day international terrorism is changing the nature of warfare—and 
as technology is changing notions of what is “domestic” and what is “foreign”—due 
process must confront the unique situation presented by the FTO designation 
scheme and the global fight against terrorism. Congress weighed those concerns 
and developed a scheme adapted to accomplish the mission. As Justice Jackson once 
wisely declared in the midst of the Second World War, “[c]ivil liberties had their 
origin and must find their ultimate guaranty in the faith of the people. If that faith 
should be lost, five or nine men in Washington could not long supply its want.”344 
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